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MAKING AND UNMAKING CITIZENS:
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF CIVIC CAPACITY
Tabatha Abu El-Haj*
American democracy is more fragile today than in recent memory. As evidence
of stubborn imbalances in political influence grow, so too does public skepticism
concerning the relative benefits of our democratic institutions. Scholars have taken
note, and two dominant camps have emerged to offer proposals for restoring
democratic accountability and responsiveness. The first, like the public, identifies
the flood of money into electoral politics as the primary source of our troubles,
whereas the second points to political parties as the root of the crisis. More recently,
however, a nascent third approach has emerged. Looking beyond the usual
suspects—money in politics or the state of our political parties—its focus is on
legal reforms that would permit everyday Americans to exercise political power
through organizations capable of providing a counterweight to the political
influence of wealth.
This Article seeks to further develop the efforts of this third approach. It argues
that a more nuanced understanding of the recursive relationship between
governance and civil society—one that appreciates the ways that public policy, as
instantiated in legislation, inevitably influences the trajectory of civil society—
permits us to envision a broader conception of law’s role in democratic reform.
This broader conception is particularly critical given that several traditional
routes have been effectively foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Toward that end, this
Article identifies opportunities for law and politics—nudged perhaps by good
governance philanthropists and technological advances—to make considerable
strides toward rebuilding a participatory civil society capable of demanding the
recognition of elected officials.
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INTRODUCTION
American democracy is more fragile today than in recent
1
memory. The corrosion of essential democratic norms—from civility to judicial independence to freedom of the press—appears to
be accelerating. Public faith in democracy is eroding, with a rising
number of Americans reporting that they no longer feel confident
2
in the relative benefits of democratic institutions. Nonvoters frequently cite a lack of faith in the efficacy of voting to explain their
3
decision to forego their democratic rights. Meanwhile, across the
partisan divide, Americans express anxiety about the corrosive in4
fluence of money on politics.
Too often, politicians seek to capitalize on this growing cynicism, rather than striving to restore faith in democratic institutions
and the rule of law. Indeed, some have become increasingly brazen
in their efforts to thwart democratic accountability. In Wisconsin,
during the most recent round of redistricting, legislators flagrantly
solicited experts for partisan electoral maps and then asked those
experts to go back and assure them that the effect would last the
5
entire decade. The attorney representing North Carolina recently
went so far as to defend such practices as a legislative prerogative
6
preserved by federalism. The North Carolina legislature stripped
its governor of key executive powers when voters elected a gover1.
See No Jargon: Democracy in Decline, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://nojargon.libsyn.com/episode-119-democracy-in-decline.
2.
See Roberto Foa & Yascha Mounk, Are Americans Losing Faith in Democracy?, VOX
(Dec. 18, 2015, 10:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2015/12/18/9360663/isdemocracy-in-trouble.
3.
See Asma Khalid, On the Sidelines of Democracy: Exploring Why So Many Americans Don’t
Vote, MORNING EDITION (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/645223716/onthe-sidelines-of-democracy-exploring-why-so-many-americans-dont-vote; Don Gonyea, What
Some West Virginia Residents Have to Say on Why They Don’t Vote, MORNING EDITION (Sept. 10,
2018, 5:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/646422511/what-some-west-virginiaresidents-have-to-saynt-on-why-they-dont-vote.
4.
Bradley Jones, Most Americans Want to Limit Campaign Spending, Say Big Donors Have
Greater Political Influence, PEW RES. CTR. (May 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/05/08/most-americans-want-to-limit-campaign-spending-say-big-donors-havegreater-political-influence/.
5.
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 849, 896 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct.
1916 (2018) (noting that Republican legislators specifically requested mapmakers produce
“Assertive” and “Aggressive” maps favoring the party). Democrats acted similarly egregiously
in Maryland. See also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2510–11 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“Events in Maryland make for a similarly grisly tale.”).
6.
Compare Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–18, Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484 (2019) (No.18-422) (defending prerogative of state legislatures to set explicit partisan
targets for redistricting processes) with Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable even though “[e]xcessive partisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem unjust” and are “incompatible with democratic
principles”) (internal citation omitted). See also id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (reflecting
that “partisan gerrymanders . . . debase[] and dishonor[] our democracy, turning upsidedown the core American idea that all governmental power derives from the people”).
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nor of a different party, and legislatures in Wisconsin and Michi7
gan followed suit after partisan losses in statewide races in 2018.
While these examples are particularly egregious, the fact is that
elected officials routinely seek to insulate themselves from ac8
countability at the polls.
When combined with partisan polarization, the demise of electoral competition and the salience of the party primary, these maneuvers render American elected officials only weakly accountable
to their constituents.
Indeed, some political scientists argue that elected officials today
are significantly more responsive to the interests of wealthy Americans, while responsiveness to the concerns and preferences of the
9
general electorate is largely coincidental. Quantifying the inequalities in congressional responsiveness, Martin Gilens and Benjamin
I. Page report that when support for a given proposal among affluent Americans reaches 75%, one can expect the policy will be
adopted 46% of the time, whereas when 75% of middle-class Amer10
icans support a policy, it “is adopted only 24 percent of the time.”
To be sure, no one expects legislative policymaking in the American system to simply follow the public’s orders (especially as
measured by public opinion polls). Still, the persistent disregard of
the public’s priorities—from delivering sensible gun control to
providing permanent legal status to childhood immigrant arrivals

7.
The legislation in Michigan was vetoed by the outgoing Republican Governor. See
Miriam Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1224–27,
1231–36 (2019) (offering a detailed description of recent efforts to “thwart . . . expressions
of popular will,” while describing how most have been struck down by state courts).
8.
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Why It Can Happen Here, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/trump-republican-partyauthoritarianism.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fopinion-columnists.
9.
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 573 (2014) (rigorously analyzing a data
set that measured trajectory of 1779 policy issues between 1981 and 2002 and concluding
that the United States has become a “democracy by coincidence”). It is worth emphasizing
that none of the main critics of Professors Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page’s study substantially undermine their main findings or their conclusion that the United States is a “democracy by coincidence.” See, e.g., Omar S. Bashir, Testing Inferences About American Politics: A Review of the “Oligarchy” Result, 2 RES. & POL. 1, 1–2 (2015) (criticizing Gilens and Page’s
quantitative method); Peter K. Enns, Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation, 13
PERSP. ON POL. 1053, 1058–61 (2015) (conceding that “[c]oincidental representation appears to be the norm” but rejecting the conclusion that this comes “at the expense of those
in the middle”). For their responses to these criticisms, see Martin Gilens, The Insufficiency of
“Democracy by Coincidence”: A Response to Peter K. Enns, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 1065 (2015) and
Martin Gilens, Simulating Representation: The Devil’s in the Detail, 3 RES. & POL. 1 (2016).
10.
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Critics Argued with Our Analysis of U.S. Political
Inequality. Here Are 5 Ways They’re Wrong, WASH. POST (May 23, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/23/critics-challengeour-portrait-of-americas-political-inequality-heres-5-ways-they-are-wrong/ (noting further
that opposition to a policy by 25% of affluent Americans results in a 4% chance of adoption,
whereas a policy similarly opposed by the middle class has a 40% chance of adoption).
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to raising the minimum wage—is unquestionably concerning.
Our republican Constitution was designed to create a space for
elected officials to shape policymaking at a distance from the immediate preferences of constituents. The intent, however, was to
prevent kneejerk majoritarianism, not to preclude responsiveness
and accountability to the citizenry.
In legal circles, two camps dominate the academic discussion
about how to restore accountability and responsiveness to our
12
democratic institutions. The first, like the public, identifies the
flood of money into electoral politics as the primary source of our
troubles. These scholars criticize the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. FEC, blaming it for the rise of Super PACs and
similar independent expenditure groups and for the recent explo13
sion of money in elections. They offer a variety of proposals
aimed at reducing the influence of money in politics.
The second school points to political parties as the root of the
14
crisis. Legislative dysfunction is attributed to polarization and the
weakened position of party leaders relative to other partisan ac-

11.
A large body of empirical research demonstrates that elected officials in both parties are largely unresponsive (sometimes stubbornly so) to the concerns of Main Street. See,
e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL
POWER IN AMERICA 113–17, 102–03 figs. 4.2 & 4.3 (2012) [hereinafter GILENS, AFFLUENCE
AND INFLUENCE] (demonstrating that legislators are most responsive to high-income Americans and least responsive to the poor and, further, that this differential responsiveness holds
across all policy domains although it is starkest for economic policy); LARRY M. BARTELS,
UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 173–75, 287–89
(2008) (concluding that as it currently functions, the American political system allows policymakers “considerable latitude” to pursue their own goals, even with respect to “issues on
which public opinion seems to be especially firm and stable” and attributing this agency
problem to the ideological and partisan commitments of elected officials). For current examples see Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Voters Are Running Out of Patience, WASH. POST (Feb. 21,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/02/21/voters-arerunning-out-of-patience/?utm_term=.c99910280042 and Noah Smith, Opinion, Raise the
(Nov.
13,
2018,
11:15
AM),
Minimum
Wage,
Congress,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-13/new-congress-should-raise-theminimum-wage.
12.
A final group of election law reformers focused on barriers to the vote, including
redistricting. In general, however, these scholars ground their work in a rights framework
rather than concerns about responsiveness or stubborn imbalances in power.
13.
See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2015); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS
DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014).
14.
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeovers of Our Hallowed
Out Political Parties, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 845 (2017); RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & JONATHAN RAUCH,
CTR. EFFECTIVE PUBLIC MGMT., BROOKINGS INST., THE STATE OF STATE PARTIES—AND HOW
STRENGTHENING THEM CAN IMPROVE OUR POLITICS (2016); Michael S. Kang, The Brave New
World of Party Campaign Finance Law, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2016); IAN VANDEWALKER &
DANIEL I. WEINER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STRONGER PARTIES, STRONGER DEMOCRACY:
RETHINKING REFORM 3 (2015); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804 (2014).
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15

tors. Policy prescriptions frequently focus on further deregulation
of campaign finance laws—hypothesizing that good governance
will be restored when political power is returned to party leaders
and the influence of Super PACs and other ideological donors is
16
diminished.
More recently, however, a nascent third approach to democratic
reform has emerged in the legal literature. Looking beyond the
usual suspects—money in politics, the state of our political parties,
polarization, and the near extinction of competitive elections—it
has focused on the ways that rising economic inequality has fed the
17
stubborn imbalance in political influence. This third approach
shares the progressive impulses of the first school. Objecting to its
myopic focus on electoral spending, however, it seeks to extend
the second school’s focus on organizations as a potential locus for
democratic revival beyond political parties to civic associations as
18
well.
The central claim of this third school is that reversing the trend
toward extreme political and economic inequality requires strategies focused on bolstering the organizational capacity of non-elite
Americans to enable them to more effectively provide a counter19
weight to the political influence of wealth. Thus, Kate Andrias has
argued that scholars should pay more attention to “facilitating the
countervailing power of ordinary citizens and their organizations

15.
For an overview of this analysis and critique of its policy prescriptions, see Tabatha
Abu El-Haj, Networking the Party: First Amendment Rights & the Pursuit of Responsive Party Government, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1225 (2018) [hereinafter Abu El-Haj, Networking the Party] (offering an alternative account of the weakness of our party system and the deficit in responsiveness).
16.
The current dysfunction is attributed to structural changes and regulatory incentives that empower individual candidates and independent expenditure groups (including
through the flow of money) and disempower parties and their leaders, who are viewed as
having greater interest in governing through compromise and moderation. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 864–70; Pildes, supra note 14, at 828–33.
17.
See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and
Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419 (2015) [hereinafter Andrias, Separations of Wealth]; Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669
(2014); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2016).
18.
See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1127,
1129–30, 1132–33 (2016) [hereinafter Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform].
19.
See, e.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 3, 142–44 (2017)
(arguing that to the degree “our current economic pathologies are rooted in disparities of
economic and political power,” the solution is to “build[] a more equitable, inclusive, and
responsive democratic system”—one which activates civic associations by providing visible
targets and levers for collective political action); see also K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as
Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 354 (2018) [hereinafter Rahman, Policymaking
as Power-Building] (“Altering the existing balance of power thus requires finding ways to bolster the underlying capacity of affected but relatively under-powered interests to exercise
power and influence on decision-makers.”).
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in governance.” And previously, I made the case for why “those
concerned about the outsized political influence of moneyed
elites” should turn their attention to strategies for “undercut[ting]
the influence money buys” by “enhanc[ing] the civic and political
organizations of ordinary Americans,” rather than “wasting their
limited resources chasing after campaign finance reforms aimed at
taking money out of politics and doctrinal theories aimed at justify21
ing those reforms.”
The recognition that “organization, like wealth, is itself a source
22
of political power” underlies this third approach. Unions offer a
prime illustration of this point: during their heyday in the middle
of the twentieth century, a period marked by prosperity and relative economic equality, unions routinely leveraged their ability to
mobilize workers to gain access to elected officials of both parties,
23
offsetting “the financial power of the business lobby.”
As such, this scholarship has focused on offering a range of discrete “interventions aimed at addressing inequalities in organiza24
tional capacity.” These have included reforms to reduce legal bar25
riers to collective action in the workplace and suggestions for how
to design government institutions to facilitate broader civic en26
gagement. Taking the latter approach, K. Sabeel Rahman has
prioritized identifying ways to enhance the opportunities for everyday citizens to influence “the bureaucratic processes of govern27
ance and policy implementation.”
20.
Kate Andrias, Confronting Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2016); see
also Andrias, Separations of Wealth, supra note 17, at 440–44.
21.
Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 18, at 1132–33 (arguing that
the potential of campaign finance regulation to root out the political influence of the
wealthy is significantly limited by the First Amendment’s requirement that there be ample
routes for political influence).
22.
Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123
YALE L.J. 148, 167 (2013) (noting further that organization “enables groups to build political
power that, like the power derived from wealth, is portable across processes of participation”).
23.
JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 157, 160–61, 181 (2014) (recounting that “[g]iven labor’s strength, politicians from heavily industrialized locales with a strong
union presence simply had no choice but to court labor’s vote, regardless of their own party
allegiances”); see also JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 140
(2010) (detailing ways unions were able to effectively counter the efforts of business on a
variety of fronts, including the minimum wage).
24.
Sachs, supra note 22, at 166.
25.
See, e.g., id. at 198–203 (proposing various legal reforms that would enhance workers’ ability to organize); see also Dayne Lee, Note, Bundling Alt-Labor: How Policy Reform Can
Facilitate Political Organization in Emerging Worker Movements, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 509
(2016).
26.
K. Sabeel Rahman, From Civic Tech to Civic Capacity: The Case of Citizen Audits, 50 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 751 (2017).
27.
RAHMAN, supra note 19, at 15, 22–23, 160–63 (arguing that insofar as agencies have
become the “‘front-line’ institutions of governance” administrative processes must be re-
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Underappreciated to date, however, is that this third approach
offers a critical intervention in the debates about how to reform
our democracy. By drawing attention to the political role of civic
organizations, it brings into relief that there are, in fact, three
28
phases to democracy (civil society, governance, and elections)
and, further, that our democratic dysfunctions can stem from any
of these three phases of democracy: civil society (political inputs),
governance (policy outputs) or the electoral interface designed to
underwrite that relationship. And it implies that there are three
potential points of entry for democratic reform.
Without denying any of the other causes for the current state of
29
democratic politics, the third school thus lays the foundation for
reimagining the entire project of democracy reform. To date,
democratic reformers have largely focused on the electoral interface—identifying and redressing impairments such as redistricting,
30
the state of political parties, ballot access, and campaign finance.
Little attention has been paid to potential impairments in political
inputs themselves. This is a mistake. Elections and political parties
represent only one point of entry into American democracy; civil
society forms another.
As far back as the nineteenth century, social theorists have understood that civil society—particularly civic associations—play a
critical role in underwriting the participation necessary for demo31
cratic responsiveness. The inverse, unfortunately, is equally true:
vamped in ways that “affirmatively enhance the countervailing power of ordinary citizens”);
see also Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, supra note 19, at 376 (describing institutional
designs with the potential to unleash “the (under-utilized) potential [of regulatory agencies]
to house and foster a more inclusive, empowered form of participation and engagement”
and to “mitigat[e] disparities of political power”).
28.
Cf. K. Sabeel Rahman, (Re)Constructing Democracy in Crisis, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1552,
1558–61 (2018) (arguing that a recognition “that democracies require state institutions, civil
society organizations, and interfaces to work well” allows us to focus on “(1) the problem of
systemic inequalities in political power and influence, and (2) the problem of systemic political exclusion, particularly along lines of race and ethnicity”).
29.
I have considered how these other causes might be addressed in other work. See
Abu El-Haj, Networking the Party, supra note 15, at 1250–75; Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 18, at 1162–63, 1175–83.
30.
To a lesser degree, scholarship has attended to deficiencies in governance itself.
31.
See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillip Bradley ed.,
Vintage Classics 1990) (1835). For similar claims about civil society in the modern era see
ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD
EFFECT (2012) (reporting finding of study with Doug McAdam that shows civic participation
is strongest in neighborhoods with the highest concentration of nonprofit organizations,
other than Black churches); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 91–99 (1994) [hereinafter PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY
WORK] (reviewing evidence that better governance in more economically advanced regions
of the country is attributable to the quality of local civil society, as measured by density in
civic associations, levels of newspaper readership, and turnout for national referendum,
among other things); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 344–47 (2000) [hereinafter PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE] (reviewing
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the absence or weakening of civil society can prejudice the demo32
cratic process. Indeed, while the public has been preoccupied
with Citizens United v. FEC and the flood of money it unleashed into
electoral politics, political scientists have been attributing the increasing solicitude of government officials to affluent citizens to
their organizational advantage relative to the middle class, while
33
dating the phenomenon to well before Citizens United.
This Article seeks to develop the broader implications of the
third school—and to do so at a moment when many of the traditional approaches to reform appear increasingly foreclosed. Toward that end, it begins with a comprehensive diagnosis of the
weaknesses in civil society that currently undermine its ability to
foster a virtuous democratic circle from political participation to
policy responsiveness. It explains how changes in the form of civic
associations since the 1970s have compounded the long-standing
unrepresentativeness of political inputs. The Achilles’ heel of
American civil society is the form of civic representation. Civic associations representing Main Street interests today have largely
stepped back from fostering active forms of civic and political participation, thereby becoming less capable of advancing democratic
accountability and responsiveness.
Second, and more importantly, this Article offers reasons to believe that something can be done about these weaknesses, including through law. Legislation, it turns out, does far more than distribute or deny benefits and rights to individuals. It shapes civil
society by influencing individuals’ relationship to and participation
in democracy, as well as the incentives that exist for building political organizations. Policies that distribute visible and generous (ideally universal) benefits in fair, non-arbitrary ways recognize individuals’ citizenship and communicate the value of government.
They create reasons to organize on the part of beneficiaries and
incentives for political parties and elites to mobilize those same
beneficiaries. Other forms of policymaking do the exact opposite.
This, then, is the central contribution of this Article. Civil society
34
is neither independent of nor impervious to law. Civil society, inevidence that communities with strong civic associations both demand and get better government); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65 (1995) (“The norms and networks of civic engagement also powerfully affect
the performance of representative government.”).
32.
PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 31, at 114–15.
33.
Task Force on Inequality & Am. Democracy, Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 651, 657 (2004).
34.
JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA 7, 189–92 (2d
ed. 2017) (contrasting social theories that account for how “civil society is not an autonomous sphere of self-contained democratic activity” with Tocqueville’s anti-statist conception
of civil society, which views civil society as a space untouched by law, and remarking that the
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cluding its potential as a source of democratic accountability or
dysfunction, is instead deeply entwined with law. Indeed, changes
in the form of federal policymaking since the Reagan era have at
once contributed to income inequality and to the inequalities in
political mobilization and organization that impede the ability of
low- and middle-income Americans to resist the political sway of
35
elites and super-elites today. In this regard, the legal-institutional
influence on civil society extends much further than the First
Amendment and the political culture of tolerance that is necessary
36
to protect the freedom of speech, association, and the press.
Once we recognize that public policy as instantiated in legislation will play some role in the trajectory of civil society and, hence,
democracy, it is possible to move beyond the myopic focus on procedural reforms and to envision policies capable of motivating individuals to participate in our democracy and stimulating the reorganization of the interests of everyday Americans. It is possible, in
other words, to begin to see a role for law in reversing the current
weaknesses in civil society.
Ultimately, it is that project to which this Article turns. In doing
so, it offers a model of what it would mean for lawyers (all lawyers,
not just election lawyers) to begin to attend to the law’s secondary
effects on civil society. Like the erosion of democratic institutions
and norms, the restoration will necessarily be an incremental and
complex process. The pertinent task is, therefore, to identify the
opportunities that exist, without ignoring the corresponding constraints that will inevitably shape and limit those efforts.
Make no mistake. There are no silver bullet policy prescriptions
in what follows. Instead, this Article shows how law’s role in democratic reform can be expanded even as the burden of restoring
American democracy must be shared. In this regard, it identifies
existing legislative opportunities to make considerable strides toward rebuilding a participatory civil society, but also the ways that
project could be advanced by both technology and the funding decisions of good governance philanthropists.
The critical stance toward reform embodied in this Article is that
restoration of a robust civil society capable of organizing and mobilizing ordinary Americans in ways that facilitate their ability to demand responsiveness and enforce accountability is by no means
guaranteed. But it is also not foreclosed. Unlike in 2016 when I belatter continues to have a hold over contemporary American social theory); see also CIVIL
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002).
35.
See infra notes 229–243 and accompanying text.
36.
Accord Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, supra note 19, at 318–20 (arguing
that it is time to recognize the “power-shifting dimensions of policy design” and the institutional features of their implementation).
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gan this Article, it is no longer possible to only emphasize the
abundant weakness of American democracy. The fact is that the
election in 2016 gave birth to some more positive democratic narratives. The 2018 midterm elections witnessed the highest level of
voter turnout in nearly a century. It also brought record numbers
of women to office and presented a significant step forward in diversifying the membership of Congress. Most importantly, those
outcomes, as we will see, were a product of a civic revival.
Part I identifies three critical weaknesses of contemporary civil
society and the ways these weaknesses contribute to the stubborn
imbalances in political influence in American politics. Part II explains the ways in which legislative and regulatory efforts have second-order effects on the political capacity of citizens in a democracy, and thus why legislation has a role to play in either reversing or
reinforcing the current trend. Finally, Part III offers a template of
what it might mean to expand the democratic reform agenda to
reap the second-order effects on civil society of legislative policymaking.
I.

AN ACCOUNTING OF DEMOCRATIC VICES AND (LATENT)
CIVIC VIRTUES

American civil society today is not well positioned to facilitate
democratic accountability and responsiveness. For one, it suffers
from unequal and unrepresentative citizen participation in all
37
stages and forums of politics. For another, the differential organizational capacity of different publics creates a chorus of interest
groups in Washington (but also in state capitols) in which some
38
voices are better heard than others. Most importantly, the decline
since the middle of the twentieth century of both private-sector unionism and class-integrated, mass-membership associations has
compounded the effects of this unequal and unrepresentative par39
ticipation. Taken together, these three dynamics significantly undercut the representativeness of political inputs into our democratic institutions, skewing policymaking in both legislatures and
administrative agencies toward the interests of the wealthy.
The George W. Bush administration’s failure to achieve the privatization of Social Security and Medicare—one of its signature
37.
See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL
POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 118 (2012) (previewing finding that “neither active individuals nor active organizations represent all politically
relevant segments of society equally”).
38.
Id.
39.
See infra notes 130-173 and accompanying text.
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campaign promises—nicely illustrates both the political vices and
potential democratic virtues of American civil society. On the side
of virtue, the invulnerability of Social Security and Medicare highlights the power of everyday Americans, when organized in effective civic associations, to achieve political responsiveness despite
opposition from moneyed interests. The snag for the Bush administration (as for others since) has proved to be the AARP, whose
political muscle derives from its 38 million members, who vote
40
regularly in large numbers.
At the same time, the sacred status of Social Security and Medicare illustrates the political vices of contemporary civil society and
41
their contribution to imbalances in political influence. The
AARP’s wins frequently come at the expense of the needs of
younger Americans. Political participation of seniors (including
those of middle to low socioeconomic status) is not matched by
42
other groups. Meanwhile, civic associations with the AARP’s ability to represent, mobilize, and educate its members are scarce in
43
contemporary civil society. As a consequence, the interests and
44
perspectives of seniors are overrepresented in American politics.
Seniors reap the rewards while the competing interests of younger
Americans—e.g., affordable college or daycare—are routinely ignored.
The real lesson then is that our democratic institutions govern
poorly when citizens are differentially and unequally organized in civil society. And therein lies a fundamentally vicious political cycle:
American policymakers are much more generous to those who are
well-organized and participate (to seniors but more importantly to
business and socioeconomic elites) than to those who remain un40.
See Suzanne Mettler, The Transformed Welfare State and the Redistribution of Political
Voice, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE
OF CONSERVATISM 191, 211 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007) [hereinafter Mettler,
Transformed Welfare State] (noting constant activism of senior citizens in the face of threats of
retrenchment of benefits); Jacob S. Hacker et al., Inequality and Public Policy, in INEQUALITY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 200 (Lawrence
R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005).
41.
Cf. David Weigel, The Trailer: How Eight Years—and President Trump—Have
POST
(Oct. 9, 2018),
Changed
the
GOP’s
Tune
on
Medicare,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/paloma/the-trailer/2018/10/09/the-trailer-howeight-years-and-president-trump-have-changed-the-gop-s-tune-onmedicare/5bbb9f691b326b7c8a8d18a8/?utm_term=.6495ca5c4f75.
42.
ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR POLITICAL
ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 14–15, 25–37, 54 (2003) (noting that the participation rates of lower and middle-class seniors are most marked when it comes to Social
Security).
43.
Id. at 78 (attributing finding that “[w]hen demographic characteristics and political
interest are controlled for, AARP members are more likely than nonmembers to contact
elected officials and to contact them about Social Security specifically”).
44.
Id. at 15 (arguing that “the crucial feature of mass politics in the United States is . . .
the participatory divergence of young and old”).
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organized (young Americans, working families, or the poor) and
on the political sidelines. This Part systematically lays out the inequalities in political participation that contribute to the imbalance
in political influence, as well as the historic transformations in the
form of our civic associations that compound the effect.
A. Unequal and Unrepresentative Political Participation
American democracy has long suffered from a well-documented
problem of unequal and unrepresentative political participation at
45
all stages of political activity. But, unlike in the past, it is no longer
tenable to dismiss the effect of unequal political participation on
the grounds that those individuals who do participate are sufficiently representative to underwrite the legitimacy of the political
inputs into the system.
1. As Citizens
Unequal and unrepresentative individual participation at all
46
stages of political activity is well documented. Apart from sen47
iors, the general rule is that individuals at the top of the socioeconomic ladder are much more likely to turn out on Election Day
than those at the bottom. Since the early 1950s, approximately
90% of those in the highest quintile of socioeconomic status (SES)
have participated in every election; by contrast, participation in the
lowest SES quintile has only broken the 60% mark a handful of
48
times.
Even when candidates and parties invest in mobilizing lowerincome and minority voters, the class bias in the electorate remains. In 2008, for example, Americans with household incomes
below the median made up only 38% of the electorate, despite
representing 55% of the population; by contrast, individuals with
incomes over $100,000 constituted 26% of the electorate, despite
the fact that only 16% of the population has a household income

45.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 147–262, 174 (noting that “[t]he ups and
downs of participatory inequality do not seem to be related to other obvious factors—in particular, to growing economic inequality”).
46.
See id. at 118.
47.
Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 156, 189 (finding seniors to be “the one group for
which a marked participatory bias favoring the affluent and educated does not exist”).
48.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 153 & fig. 6.1.
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49

above $100,000. This class bias is significantly worse during mid50
terms and in state and local elections.
Income is obviously not the only relevant characteristic when
51
considering the representativeness of the electorate. That said, in
recent years, the electorate has been significantly less racially un52
representative. To the degree racial inequalities in rates of political participation persist, they are a product of disparities in educa53
tion and income. Indeed, African Americans, particularly women,
vote at higher rates than their socioeconomic status would pre54
dict, and African-American youth, despite lower levels of income
and education on average, are more civically and politically en55
gaged than their white counterparts. Meanwhile, traditional differences in voter turnout by sex have dissipated, with voter turnout

49.
See Joe Soss & Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Place of Inequality: Non-participation in the
American Polity, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 95, 97 (2009).
50.
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 133; Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 111 (2013); see also Asma Khalid, On the
Sidelines of Democracy: Exploring Why So Many Americans Don’t Vote, MORNING EDITION (Sept.
10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/645223716/on-the-sidelines-of-democracyexploring-why-so-many-americans-dont-vote (noting both that voter turnout is extremely and
consistently low in midterm elections as well as the fact that those who do not turn out are
significantly more likely to be lower income and less educated). It is worth acknowledging,
however, that while the affluent are more likely to turn out in every state, the magnitude of
participation gap varies significantly by state. See, e.g., Patrick Flavin, Does Higher Voter Turnout
Among the Poor Lead to More Equal Representation?, 49 SOC. SCI. J. 405, 406, 410 (2012); Kim
Quaile Hill & Jan E. Leighley, The Policy Consequences of Class Bias in State Electorates, 36 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 351, 355 (1992).
51.
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 216 & fig. 8.4; Elaine Kamarck & Alexander
R. Podkul, The 2018 Primaries Project: The Demographics of Primary Voters, BROOKINGS INST.
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-2018-primaries-project-thedemographics-of-primary.
52.
U.S. Election Project, Voter Turnout Demographics, http://www.electproject.org/
home/voter-turnout/demographics (depicting trends from 1984–2018); see also Jens Manuel
Krogstad et al., Historic Highs in 2018 Voter Turnout Extended Across Racial and Ethnic Groups,
PEW RES. CTR. (May 1, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/01/historichighs-in-2018-voter-turnout-extended-across-racial-and-ethnic-groups/;
Jens
Manuel
Krogstad and Mark Hugo Lopez, Black Voter Turnout Fell in 2016, Even as a Record Number of
Americans Cast Ballots, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/05/12/black-voter-turnout-fell-in-2016-even-as-a-record-number-of-americanscast-ballots/.
53.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 231 (noting that “[t]he disparity in participation between African Americans and Anglo whites disappears when racial differences in education and income are taken into account”).
54.
See Allison P. Anoll, What Makes a Good Neighbor? Race, Place, and Norms of Political
Participation, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 494, 495–96, 500 (2018) (reviewing studies that find
“that when controlling for individual-level resources like income and education, Black
Americans often outperform Whites in models of voting” and hypothesizing that this may be
because African Americans value those who are politically active, as voters and protestors,
significantly more than white Americans do).
55.
Jonathan F. Zaff et al., An Inequitable Invitation to Citizenship: Non-College-Bound Youth
and Civic Engagement at 10 PACE (Oct. 2009) (noting that “African-American youth . . . surpass whites on most measures of civic engagement, due, at least in some part, to traditions,
norms, and institutions that promote participation in the Black community”).
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rates for women, particularly African-American and Latino women,
56
consistently higher compared to men.
57
Age, however, remains a critical source of bias in the electorate,
58
especially during midterm elections. A recent review of validated
voters in the 2016 election found that “compared with validated
voters, nonvoters were more likely to be younger, less educated,
59
less affluent, and nonwhite.” Underscoring the significance of
nonparticipation, the study also found that they were much more
60
likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party. This same study
found that “[j]ust 13% of validated voters in 2016 were younger
61
than 30” as compared to 33% of nonvoters.
The 2018 midterms did mark a significant improvement, with
the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and
Engagement estimating that 31% of youth (ages 18 to 29) turned
62
out to vote in the 2018 midterms. That said, optimism should be
tempered because the youth share of the vote was 9%, as com63
pared to 32% for those over 65. Another reason for caution is that
upticks in youth turnout are often disproportionately driven by the

56.
Hannah Hartig, FACT TANK: In Year of Record Midterm Turnout, Women Continued to
RES.
CTR.
(May 3, 2019),
Vote
at
Higher
Rates
than
Men,
PEW
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/03/in-year-of-record-midterm-turnoutwomen-continued-to-vote-at-higher-rates-than-men/; see also Stephen Ansolabehere & Eitan
Hersh, Gender, Race and Voting: A Research Note, 1 POL. & GOVERNANCE 132 (2013) (using a
national sample of 1.9 million registrants to show that women registered and voted at higher
rates than men, in 2008, and that black women voted at a higher rate than white men, in
order to reveal methodological shortcomings of standard approaches to measuring rates of
turnout); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 231 (explaining that “[t]he gap in activity
between women and men can be fully explained by gender differences in education, income, civic skills, and political engagement”).
57.
Asma Khalid, Millennials Now Rival Baby Boomers as a Political Force, but Will They Actually Vote?, NPR (May 16, 2016, 2:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/05/16/478237882/
millennials-now-rival-boomers-as-a-political-force-but-will-they-actually-vote.
58.
CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 29 (reviewing trends from 1959–1998 and showing that
seniors, because of increases in participation, are now “more than twice as likely to vote in
midterm elections as those under 35”).
59.
An Examination of the 2016 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters, PEW RES. CTR.
(Aug. 9, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016electorate-based-on-validated-voters/ (providing a visual graphic comparing demographics
of voters and nonvoters).
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Young People Dramatically Increase Their Turnout to 31%, Shape 2018 Midterm Elections,
CIRCLE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://civicyouth.org/young-people-dramatically-increase-theirturnout-31-percent-shape-2018-midterm-elections/. In 2016, youth turnout was around 50%.
William A. Galston & Clara Hendrikson, How Millennials Voted this Election, BROOKINGS INST.
(Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/11/21/how-millennialsvoted/.
63.
Matthew Yglesias, The 2018 Electorate Was Older, Whiter, and Better Educated Than in
2016, VOX (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/12/
18083014/2018-election-results-turnout. See generally Understanding Voting Data: Youth Turnout
vs. Youth Share, CIRCLE (Nov. 1, 2018), https://civicyouth.org/understanding-voting-datayouth-turnout-vs-youth-share/.
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behavior of college-bound youth from higher-income families and
64
communities. Non-college bound youth, however, comprise about
65
50% of the population aged 15 to 29 years old. Finally, differential turnout between age groups is partly attributable to the natural
66
life-cycle, posing a bona fide risk that over attention to the inter67
ests of older citizens is difficult to offset.
The unrepresentativeness of political participation is even more
pronounced among volunteers and donors to political cam68
paigns. A 2016 study of campaign contributors documents that
the bulk of money coming into campaign coffers is donated by individuals who are disproportionately wealthy, white, male, and
69
old. These statistics are troubling because the prevalence of uncompetitive elections creates significant pressure on elected officials to be particularly solicitous to the views of donors and cam70
paign activists, above those of their constituents.
Finally, inequality is not limited to the electoral sphere: it shapes
all aspects of political participation. From contacting members of
Congress, to participating in political marches, lower-income
Americans are significantly less likely to engage in American poli-

64.
Cf. Zaff et al., supra note 55, at 6–7, 22 (reporting that “[i]ncreases in voting, volunteering, and other forms of civic engagement are driven disproportionately by young people
from higher-income families and communities,” while lamenting that “[t]he bulk of get-outthe-vote efforts are focused on college campuses” or target low-income youth who are college-bound).
65.
Id. at 7. The study’s figure is consistent with what we know about college completion despite the fact that the author’s suggestion that the high rate is driven by the fact that
one in four students do not complete high school is not credible. Current census data shows
the percentage of Americans without a high school degree at just under 10 percent, and
others estimate high school drop out rates at about 4%. Compare U.S. Census Bureau, Press
Release: Highest Educational Levels Reached by Adults in the U.S. Since 1940 (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2017/cb17-51.html (reporting that, in
2016, among those “25 years and older, 89.1 percent had completed high school (or equivalent) or more education”) with NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, Fast Facts: Dropout Rates,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=16 (lasted visited Nov. 18, 2019) (reporting
that “[t]he overall . . . dropout rate [defined as “the percentage of 16- to 24-year-olds . . .
who are not enrolled in school and have not earned a high school credential”] decreased
from 9.7 percent in 2006 to 5.4 percent in 2017”).
66.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 209.
67.
Id. at 209, 231 (“Life-cycle differences seem to persist even after controlling for a
large number of factors.”).
68.
Id. at 157–62.
69.
See Sean McElwee, Whose Voice, Whose Choice? The Distorting Influence of the Political
(Dec. 8, 2016),
Donor
Class
in
Our
Big-Money
Elections,
DEMOS
https://www.demos.org/research/whose-voice-whose-choice-distorting-influence-politicaldonor-class-our-big-money.
70.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 251 (noting the incentives elected officials
have to keep “the activists who provide the volunteer labor and dollars that make campaigns
possible” happy and the ways that “[t]he need to pay attention to high-SES opinionated
campaign activists has the potential both to tilt public policy away from the needs of the
median voter”).
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71

tics as compared to wealthier citizens. Recent protest participation offers one measure: those who engaged in protest marches in
the first two years of the Trump presidency were better educated
72
and more affluent than their fellow Americans, on average.
The critical point, however, is that it is no longer tenable to dismiss these inequalities on the grounds that those who participate
are sufficiently representative to underwrite the legitimacy of the
73
political inputs into the system. In their seminal 2012 study, Kay
Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady found that
as compared to active voters, inactive voters are not only much
more likely to report struggling to pay bills, obtain healthcare, and
find decent housing, but also much more likely to have utilized
74
public benefit programs. Similar differences are evident among
individuals active in politics. Those with more “limited income and
education . . . [are] considerably more likely” to raise concerns
75
about basic needs such as “poverty, jobs, health, [and] housing.”
71.
See Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 97 (noting further that “[c]ompared to wealthier citizens, lower income Americans tend to vote at lower rates and to participate less in a
variety of other political behaviors, including writing letters to members of Congress and
protesting”).
72.
Mary Jordan & Scott Clement, In Reaction to Trump, Millions of Americans Are Joining
Protests and Getting Political, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/national/wp/2018/04/06/feature/in-reaction-to-trump-millions-of-americans-arejoining-protests-and-getting-political/?utm_term=.8a283d45f4d5 (reporting that 44% of participants were at least 50 years old, 36% earned more than $100,000, and a large portion
lived in the suburbs); Sarah Kaplan, A Scientist Who Studies Protest Says ‘The Resistance’ Isn’t
Slowing Down, WASH. POST (May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speakingof-science/wp/2017/05/03/a-scientist-who-studies-protest-says-the-resistance-isnt-slowingdown/?utm_term=.ae1c47a9f838 (reporting that “[m]ore than three-quarters of participants at [the Women’s March, the March for Science, and the People’s Climate March] had
at least a bachelor’s degree” and “53 percent [of those at the Women’s March] had a graduate or professional degree” ). Nationally, only about one in three Americans hold a bachelor’s degree. See U.S. Census Bureau, Press Release: Highest Educational Levels Reached by
Adults in the U.S. Since 1940 (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2017/cb17-51.html (announcing 2016 Current Population Survey Annual Social
and Economic Supplement found 33.4 percent of adult Americans hold a bachelor’s degree
and report incomes approximately $30,000 higher than Americans who hold only a high
school diploma on average). That said, this generalization may not hold for African Americans and Latinos, who tend to value grassroots political participation, including protest participation, more than Whites. Whether viewing such practices as critical to gaining equal
citizenship translates into higher rates of protest participation is, however, less clear. See
Anoll, supra note 54, at 495, 498 (finding that Blacks and Latinos “are more likely than
Whites to value political rallies, especially their ability to transform their communities for
the better”).
73.
See John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented?, 67 J. POL. 1206,
1213–14, 1221, 1223 (2005) (concluding that “[w]hether or not a conservatively biased electorate can help elect a Republican, it seems to move Senators’ roll-call votes in a conservative direction”). But see Emily Badger, What if Everyone Voted? Or at Least Voted at Equal Rates.,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/upshot/what-ifeveryone-voted.html (reporting on new data showing that even who is elected would likely
change if the electorate were more representative).
74.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 126–29.
75.
Id. at 132.
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The result, as Schlozman and her colleagues note, is that “public
officials are likely to “hear[] less about . . . matters” of significance
to the socioeconomically disadvantaged because they are broadly
76
inactive in politics.
Who participates in politics—and more importantly who does
77
not—matters a great deal for policymaking. A threshold level of
representative political participation at the individual level is necessary not only to legitimize the system but to ensure a measure of
accountability and responsiveness. Thus, the overrepresentation of
socioeconomic elites among individuals who participate politically
creates an electorate with views much closer to those of moneyed
78
interests than those of the eligible electorate. The fact is that even
as Americans do not like to discuss class, Americans from different
socioeconomic backgrounds exhibit different preferences with respect to economic policies (from welfare spending to taxes) and
79
different cultural sensibilities. The underrepresentation of young
citizens creates similar problems. Young Americans by and large
support gay marriage, hold a broad conception of sexual harassment, recognize the persistence of racial discrimination, embrace
diversity, and generally have more liberal outlooks as compared to
80
their elders. Young Americans overwhelmingly identify with the
Democratic Party, while older Americans are more evenly divided

76.
Id.
77.
Id. at 118 (previewing finding that “activity by both citizens and organized interests
makes a difference for public policy, and, if anything, public officials are disproportionately
responsive to the affluent and well-educated members of their constituencies”); see also id. at
141–44 (reviewing literature on relationship of public input to policy responsiveness). But see
Stuart N. Soroka & Christopher Wlezien, On the Limits to Inequality in Representation, 41 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 319, 321, 323–24 (2008) (arguing that the policy consequences of unequal
representation are insignificant because only rarely—such as in relation to tax and welfare
policy—do low and high-income Americans differ in their policy preferences).
78.
See Benjamin I. Page & Cari Lynn Hennessy, What Affluent Americans Want from
Politics 8–11 (Sept. 2–5, 2010) (APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper) (finding more differences between the political preferences of the top 4% of income earners and those of lowerincome Americans, than between the top 33% of income earners and those of lower-income
Americans, especially with respect to economic policy); see also Jeffrey A. Winters & Benjamin I. Page, Oligarchy in the United States?, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 731, 738 (2009).
79.
See, e.g., Most See Inequality Growing, but Partisans Differ over Solutions at 8, PEW RES.
CTR. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/23/most-see-inequalitygrowing-but-partisans-differ-over-solutions/ (finding significant differences between the
views of those with family incomes of less than $30,000 and those with family incomes of at
least $75,000, especially with respect to redistributive policies).
80.
Kim Parker et al., Generation Z Looks a Lot Like Millennials on Key Social and Political
Issues, PEW RES. CTR. (2019), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/3/2019/01/Generations-full-report_FINAL_1.18.pdf; accord PEW RES. CTR., The Generation Gap in American Politics (2018), http://www.people-press.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/4/2018/03/03-01-18-Generations-release2.pdf (noting, in particular, that Republicans in this generation differ from their older counterparts in being more aware of
ongoing racial discrimination, valuing racial and ethnic diversity, seeking government solutions to social problems, and attributing climate change to human activity).
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in their party allegiances. They also have different priorities with
respect to government spending from older Americans, who (unsurprisingly) prioritize maintaining Social Security and Medicare
82
over government spending on either K-12 or higher education.
2. Of Organizations
Unequal and unrepresentative participation in politics extends
beyond individuals to organizations. Despite the plethora of public
interest organizations, the chorus of interest groups in American
politics is not representative of the full spectrum of interests. This
skews political inputs once again. Its significance is magnified to
the extent that individual political participation, even if representative, cannot create an effective counterweight to elite interests
in the absence of organizations.
The most salient axis of organizational inequality in the New
Gilded Age is economic. For one, business and other economic in83
terests are much better organized than those of citizens. For another, critical economic interests—those of part-time workers, parents of young children, and the beneficiaries of means-tested
84
federal programs—essentially lack a presence in Washington.
Indeed, it is beyond dispute that “the voices of advocates for
broad publics and the less privileged are . . . muted” in the chorus
85
of American interest group politics. In their 2012 longitudinal
study of federal interest groups, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady
document the various inequalities that shape the so-called “un86
heavenly chorus” of interest group politics. First and foremost,
their work confirms what has been long recognized: the bulk of
civic groups engaging with Congress represent American business
87
interests. Altogether, “more than half, 53 percent, [of all organi81.
PEW RES. CTR., Wide Gender Gap, Growing Educational Divide in Voters’ Party Identification (2018), http://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/03/03-20-18Party-Identification-CORRECTED.pdf (reporting that “nearly six-in-ten Millennials (59%)
affiliate with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic, compared with about half of Gen
Xers and Boomers (48% each) and 43% of voters in the Silent Generation”).
82.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 205–09.
83.
See Gilens & Page, supra note 9, at 572.
84.
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 344.
85.
Id. at 443.
86.
The quantitative study is based on an analysis of organizations listed in the 1981,
1991, 2001, and 2006 Washington Representatives directory. Id. at 317. The data set does not
include organizations that only have a presence in state and local politics. Id. at 318.
87.
Id. at 657; Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., Inequalities of Political Voice, in INEQUALITY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 19, 53 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005) (reviewing literature and concluding that
“[t]he set of organized political interests continues to be organized principally around economic matters . . . and to be dominated by business and the professions”).
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zations active in Washington] represent business in one way or an88
other.”
Second, most of the groups engaged in politics in Washington
89
represent institutional interests, not people. Associations with individual (as opposed to organizational) members constitute only
90
about an eighth of the groups engaged in Washington politics.
Despite their market share, such groups are disproportionately in91
volved in critical policymaking debates. Still, with fewer resources
they are often “spread thin” in their efforts and struggle to set the
92
legislative agenda.
Third, these groups do not represent the full swath of citizens’
93
interests. Indeed, the underrepresentation of the interests of lowto middle-income Americans among the citizen groups that do exist is one of the most troubling features of interest group politics
today. Americans of lower socioeconomic status are significantly
less likely to belong to an organization that takes a stand on public
94
issues, as compared to their higher SES counterparts.
In this regard, two findings in the Schlozman study are particularly shocking from an equity and inclusion perspective. First, “unless they are members of unions, those whose work is unskilled
have no occupational associations at all to represent their interests
95
in Washington.” The bulk of America’s low-skill workers—
“bellhops, telemarketers, hotel desk clerks, laundry workers, bus
drivers, bartenders, custodians, bank tellers, or tool and die makers”—have no means of influencing Washington politics, unless
96
they happen to be unionized. During the period of the study,
“more than 90 million American workers [were employed] in
97
nonprofessional and nonmanagerial occupations.” To be sure,
88.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 322.
89.
Id. at 265, 319 (noting that “the majority of organizations active in political life have
no members in the usual sense of the word”).
90.
Id. at 319–20 & tab. 11.2 (reporting that, in 2001, “only 12 percent of the organizations listed in the Washington Representatives directory were associations of individuals”).
91.
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO
LOSES, AND WHY 10–11 (2009) (arguing that “[c]itizen groups are . . . more important to
policy debates than simple numbers would indicate because, like unions, they tend to be
active and recognized as major players on many issues”).
92.
Id. at 11, 13.
93.
Id.
94.
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 23, at 140 (reporting a one-third difference in likelihood).
95.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 328, 346.
96.
Id. (noting that “other than unions, there are no occupational associations at all to
organize those who labor at low-skill jobs”).
97.
Id. at 328. In 2014, “about 10 percent of the active workforce . . . were selfemployed” (approximately 14.6 million people) and an additional 29.4 million worked for
self-employed individuals. Drew DeSilver, 10 Facts About American Workers, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/01/8-facts-aboutamerican-workers/.
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some of these low-skill workers are represented by unions. That
said, the proportion of the American workforce that is unionized
has declined to a mere 10.5%, with private-sector unionism falling
98
to closer to 6.4%.
Second, organizations that advocate for the poor are virtually
99
nonexistent. In fact, during the time period under study, “there
[was] not a single organization that [brought] together recipients
of means-tested government benefits such as Medicaid [to] act[]
100
on their own behalf.” The over 70 million Americans who depend on Medicaid and CHIP must rely on professional organizations to advocate on their behalf—organizations that, by their own
101
reports, are woefully inept at incorporating beneficiaries.
The story is markedly different for higher SES Americans. Those
whose work requires a college degree are much more likely to belong to a membership organization representing their profes102
sion. Indeed, professionals—whether “criminal defense lawyers,
plant physiologists, landscape architects, [or] historians”—are ex103
tremely well organized. Schlozman and her colleagues found half
of the groups representing individuals on the basis of their occupa104
tion are associations of professionals. Individuals with higher levels of educational attainment are also “much more likely than

98.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release: Union Members—2018 (Jan. 19, 2019)
(noting that the percentage represents about 14.7 million Americans and constitutes a decline in nearly 10 percent and 3 million union workers since 1983, the closest year for which
there are comparable figures).
99.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 325–26, 327.
100.
Id. at 321 & tab. 11.3, 346 (study is of a twenty-five-year period using complete data
on organizations in Washington directory for five discrete years).
101.
JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL
POLITICS 1152–56 (2018) (reporting that “the role of actual beneficiaries in shaping the advocacy of professional organizations . . . was woefully limited”); see also id. at 11 (noting that
“[a]s of 2017, more than 70 million Americans had health coverage through Medicaid”).
For more recent statistics on Medicaid and CHIP see October 2018 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/programinformation/medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-data/report-highlights/index.html (last visited
Feb. 1, 2019). The significance of this lack of representation is magnified when one notes
that, by some estimates, 40% of American children depend on means-tested federal programs for healthcare. See Rachel West & Katherine Gallagher Robbins, Who Receives
AM.
PROGRESS
(July 20, 2017),
Medicaid?
A
State-by-State
Breakdown,
CTR.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2017/07/20/436243/receivesmedicaid-state-state-breakdown/; see also Nicki Lisa Cole, Who Really Receives Welfare and Government Entitlements, THOUGHTCO.COM (July 13, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/whoreally-receives-welfare-4126592.
102.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 325–26, 327 (reporting that “those who do
work that requires high levels of education—and, to a lesser extent, confers high levels of
income—are very likely to be represented by an organization in Washington”).
103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 327 (noting further that a large proportion of groups organized around identity politics represent the interests of professionals from that group).
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those lower down to be affiliated with a political organization” and
to report having taken an active leadership role within those politi106
cal organizations. All these facts “reinforce the upper-class accent
107
of the heavenly chorus.”
Finally, and least surprisingly, the number of Americans involved
in groups associated with public goods, such as clean water or safer
streets, “is far smaller than the proportion who would benefit from
108
those conditions.” While it is not shocking that the interest
groups that exist underrepresent broad but diffuse interests in
109
public goods, this too has obvious and unfortunate implications
for policymaking.
In all, these associational inequalities significantly hamper the
capacity of American civil society to demand responsiveness to the
interests of everyday Americans. While the organizational advantages of business and economic interests do not guarantee their
success, it does give them the upper hand when it comes to legisla110
tive priorities. Indeed, a seminal study questioning the dogma
that moneyed interests inevitably prevail in Washington attributes
the “conspicuous . . . paucity of issues relating to the poor and to
the economic security of working-class Americans” on the legislative agenda to the fact that these groups lack an organizational seat
111
at the table.

105.
Id. at 377; see also id. at 378 & figs. 13.2 & 13.2 (emphasis added) (further summarizing that “[w]hen we restrict our purview to members of political organizations, we find that,
compared to those in the lowest SES quintile, those in the highest quintile are nearly twice
as likely to have attended a meeting, nearly three times as likely to have been active, and
more than three times as likely to have served on the board or as an officer”).
106.
Id. at 380 (“Not only are the well-educated and affluent more likely to be affiliated
with political organizations, but, even among members, they are also more likely to be active
in those organizations and to serve on the board or as officers.”).
107.
Id. at 346, 380 (concluding that “the economically disadvantaged are underrepresented in pressure politics”).
108.
Id. at 54.
109.
It is well-established that classic collective action dilemmas, most particularly those
associated with transaction costs and free-ridership, pose significant barriers to the formation of organizations to represent diffuse interests. Id. at 278, 316, 345 (noting, further,
that the “formal presentation of the free rider problem often miss the differences among
constituencies in their ability to bear those costs” and thus the ways that “resource constraints have a powerful impact on which voices are heard through the medium of collective
advocacy”).
110.
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 91, at 16, 25 (2009) (concluding that wealth is not
a good predictor of policy success largely because of two factors: first, the status quo bias,
and, second, the fact that most policies implicate competing economic interests); see also id.
at 240 (acknowledging that the status quo “already” incorporates the substantial “biases . . .
inherent in the system of interest-group mobilization”).
111.
Id. at 255–58 (noting, further, the divergence between the issues that organizational
interests seek to place on the legislative agenda through lobbying and the public’s priorities).
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B. From Elks to Policy Wonks:
The Shifting Structure of Civic Associations
Everyday citizens must be organized to demand responsive112
ness. Indeed, influencing legislative priorities and executive poli113
cymaking requires the presence of powerful civic associations. In
this regard, the structural weakness of contemporary civil society
goes well beyond uneven representation. It also lies in the form of
that representation: for the most part, civic groups that represent
the interests of ordinary Americans are no longer capable of sustaining civic engagement in ways that produce responsiveness and
enforce accountability. This in turn reinforces the political distortion that arises out of the long-standing problem that not all interests in the United States participate equally as individuals or
through organizations.
1. Participatory Civic Associations of the Mid-Twentieth Century
Understanding this claim requires a clear picture of what American civil society looked like before the great social movements of
the twentieth century. Until the early 1970s, American civil society
was dominated by unions but also by federated organizations with
dues-paying members from working- and middle-class house114
holds. While formed for nonpolitical ends, unions and associations, from the American Legion and Knights of Labor to the National Congress of Mothers, fostered democratic participation and
responsiveness in myriad ways. Without minimizing that most of
these organizations partook of racial exclusion and sexsegregation, comprehending their political virtues is critical to any
effort to rebuild the political muscle of ordinary Americans.

112.
Cf. Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 577–78 (2012) (identifying a large “blind
spot” with respect to information about official behavior, which renders ordinary voters incapable of holding politicians accountable through monitoring).
113.
See GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 11, at 121–23 (noting that where
“poor and middle-income Americans have powerful [civic] allies” they have been able to
maintain social welfare programs).
114.
THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN
AMERICAN CIVIL LIFE 153–57, tbl. 4.3 (2003) (documenting the decline in membership in
classic mid-twentieth-century federated civic associations—sex-segregated ones, such as the
American Legion, the American Bowling Congress and the General Federation of Women’s
Clubs, as well as those that were gender integrated, such as the PTO and the Scouts); see also
id. at 163–71 (arguing that while the evidence is mixed, it is unlikely that membership has
simply transferred to more locally oriented face-to-face groups); accord PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE, supra note 31, at 30–35 (finding a drop off in small face-to-face civic organizations
after the 1960s as fewer individuals opted to join such groups).
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First, the face-to-face and personal quality of participation in the
civic associations that dominated American civil society from the
Civil War to the middle of the twentieth century fueled both civic
engagement and political power. This is because relationships and
social networks drive political recruitment and mobilization far
115
more than ideology and belief. While money, education, civic
116
skills, and political interest all play a significant role, empirical
research consistently finds that individuals are much more likely to
respond to calls for political action if they have a social connec117
tion—even a distant one—to the person making the ask. Indeed,
some researchers attribute the higher rates of political participation among those with higher levels of educational attainment to
the fact that they are more likely “to be located in the social net118
works through which requests for political activity are mediated.”
Similarly, the exceptional political participation of seniors is partially attributable to the frequency with which they are mobilized
119
by political parties and others.
A second significant source of political strength for civic groups
formed after the Civil War was that “virtually all [local] chapters
included men or women of different occupational and class back120
grounds.” A study of veterans of World War II is revealing in this
regard. It found that even among veterans with graduate education, only half of their civic memberships were in elite professional
121
groups. The other half of the groups they joined, upon returning
122
home, included members of various socioeconomic classes.
115.
See Henry H. Brady et al., Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation, 89 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 271, 285 (1995) (concluding that “motivations such as interest in politics are
not enough to explain political participation”).
116.
For an overview of these individual factors as well as different approaches to explaining political participation, see id. at 271, and MICHENER, supra note 101, at 26–27, fig.
2.1.
117.
See SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 3–4 (1995) (finding that “[t]hose who have both the motivation and the capacity
to become active are more likely to do so if they are asked” and further that motivation and
capacity themselves arise out of social experiences, institutions, and associations); see also
Florence Passy, Social Networks Matter. But How?, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND NETWORKS:
RELATIONAL APPROACHES TO COLLECTIVE ACTION 21, 24, 34 (Mario Diani & Doug McAdam
eds., 2003) (reviewing literature showing that a primary path by which individuals disposed
to take political action are connected to opportunities to do so is through social ties).
118.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 150.
119.
CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 74 (noting that “one reason they vote at high rates is
that they are mobilized by political parties during election season”); see also id. at 78 (on
mobilization effects of the AARP).
120.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 108; see also id. at 110 (noting further that biographies
of prominent businessmen, politicians, professionals and wives often involved long accounts
of their membership in the same civic associations that record numbers of ordinary Americans joined as well).
121.
SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAKING OF THE
GREATEST GENERATION 129 (2005) [hereinafter METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS] (reporting
further that “[o]nly about 20 percent of veterans with college or graduate education were
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The resulting socioeconomically integrated social networks provided breadth to potential social and political movements. In addition, membership in such groups served to ground political elites
in the experiences of their fellow Americans. Because political success depended on building a broad political network, bound by
personal ties, starting at home, “leaders and would-be leaders, no
matter how privileged in the larger society” were forced “to inter123
act with a wide range of their fellow citizens.” In this way, the participatory structures of the associations of the past “encouraged a
two-way linkage between members and leaders,” even as they were
124
sex-segregated and racially exclusionary.
Third, most civic groups were democratically governed. Democratic governance served multiple civic-capacity building functions.
It facilitated the development of important skills. Weekly and
monthly meetings of the local chapter had to be organized. Individuals were asked to run for offices within the group, to vote, and
to participate in the federated structure if elected. This too encouraged the development of civic habits. Equally important, given
the socioeconomic inclusiveness of membership, these civic skills
frequently accrued to individuals without high levels of educational
attainment, and—since there were parallel groups—to women and
125
African Americans as well.
Finally, the fact that internal governance structures were modeled on the U.S. Constitution meant everyday Americans were socialized into the representative, deliberative, and organizational
126
practices of democracy as well as into its republican values. It also
meant that most organizations operated through a federated structure, thereby augmenting their political potential by providing
both state-wide and national presence.
Unions, though neither socioeconomically integrated nor formally federated, achieved similar civic capacity by linking local
units into a national operation. Organized around worksites, unions also capitalized on social ties to mobilize workers and to gain
127
access to elected officials and party leaders. Meanwhile, their internal governance structures fostered civic and political skills
among non-college educated and lower middle-class members. As
active only in organizations with other elites, while fully 80 percent or more counted crossclass organizations among their memberships”).
122.
Id.
123.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 108; see also id. at 113 (noting that, in the absence of
the mass media, men aspiring to political power “necessarily participated in and . . . buil[t]
extensive interpersonal networks not confined to particular occupational or social circles”).
124.
Id. at 108.
125.
Id; see also SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 48.
126.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 98–115.
127.
ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 157.
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Jake Rosenfeld summarizes, “[unions] boosted the political participation of non-elites, giving voice to the policy preferences of the
128
working and middle class.”
In all, the federated, membership-based, voluntary associations
and unions that existed through the mid-twentieth century, despite
their vices, offered an invaluable democratic virtue: they advanced
a cycle of civic mindedness, political engagement, and policy re129
sponsiveness.
2. Contemporary Civic Associations as
Professional Advocacy Groups
American civil society looks quite different today. Economic and
social changes since the 1970s have radically shifted the structure
and texture of our civic associations. National networks of membership-based associations that fostered an active form of civic and
political engagement have largely been replaced by policy-shops
located in major metropolitan areas, staffed by professionals, and
focused on national politics. Meanwhile, economic and political
changes have significantly reduced the scale and power of unions,
especially in the private sector. These shifts have had profound political consequences.
130
Although the precise dynamics are contested, membership
levels in federated organizations fell precipitously starting in the
131
1970s. A key study by Theda Skocpol finds that membership in
the federated, socioeconomically integrated associations long at
the center of American civil society has dropped by 60%, as com132
pared to a 28% drop among professional societies. Even veter133
ans’ groups were not immune.
The tenor of contemporary civic associations is one of profes134
sional management and foundation support. Typically, these

128.
Id. at 181.
129.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 117–24.
130.
The most prominent debate regarding the cause has been between Robert Putnam
and Theda Skocpol. Putnam attributes the lion’s share of the change to generational replacement. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 266–73. Skocpol, however, is
skeptical that generational change can account for the abruptness of the shift. In her view,
change was due in significant part to social changes which made the racist and sexsegregated traditions of these groups increasingly off-putting to potential young members.
See SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 175, 178–82.
131.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 212–19, figs. 5.9 & 5.10.
132.
Id.
133.
Id. at 175, 178–82 (arguing that the nature of the conflict in Vietnam and the ambivalence about the war at home undercut the appeal of veterans’ associations to those returning from Southeast Asia).
134.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 224.
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groups are heavily staffed and bureaucratically run even when they
135
formally have members. While some estimate that a quarter of
local civic groups remain affiliated with federated national organi136
zations, members rarely have formal opportunities to choose
137
leaders or decide policy priorities. Instead, membership is largely
138
confined to periodic monetary donations.
In part, this shift can be explained by changes in the political
economy of civil society that undermined the incentives for organizations to invest in building a grassroots membership or cultivating leaders out of those members. Pulled toward litigating in the
courts and lobbying in Washington, civic groups have moved away
from both local community engagement and electoral politics
139
since the 1970s. Meanwhile, their legislative successes and the increased availability of grants to subsidize movement organizations
140
spurred the professionalization of such groups. Even those federated civic associations that have been founded since the 1970s,
such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving, do not necessarily depend
141
on local membership dues. Groups abandoned the practice of
shared governance with regular meetings, volunteers, and locally
cultivated leaders, and lost the socioeconomic integration of the
membership base that remained. Indeed, a recent study of civic associations that engaged in Washington politics found that only one
142
in eight was “a classic voluntary association.”
To be sure, participatory membership-based groups, including
the National Lawyers Guild and the League of Women Voters,
143
have persisted, and new membership-based groups—such as the

135.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 51 (remarking that “membership . . .
means moving a pen, not making a meeting”).
136.
John D. McCarthy, Persistence and Change Among Nationally Federated Social Movements,
in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 193, 205–06 (Gerald F. Davis et al.,
eds., 2005) (estimating, based on a variety of sources, that approximately 25% of local social
movement organizations founded in any given time period are affiliated with national
groups, while acknowledging there has been “a trend toward the founding of nonmembership” civic groups since 1979).
137.
Id. at 206–10; cf. id. at 214–19 (articulating the incentives and strategies to control
local chapters that are available to the national headquarters of contemporary federated
organizations).
138.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 51.
139.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 200–02, 206–10.
140.
Id.
141.
See McCarthy, supra note 136, at 214–15, 222 (noting, for example, that local chapters of Mothers Against Drunk Driving generally sought only to secure the requisite number
of members (20) to qualify as a chapter).
142.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 319–20 & tab. 11.2. Many of these organizations tend to be extremely important in policy debates.
143.
Kenneth T. Andrews et al., Leadership, Membership, and Voice: Civic Associations that
Work, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1191, 1193 (2010) (noting that “not all civic associations are in decline” and further that “an estimated 25% of all local social movement organizations in the
United States” are affiliated with federated groups).
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Kensington Welfare Rights Union—have been founded since the
144
1970s, particularly at the local level. Still, these groups typically
lack the numbers and national scale of their mid-twentieth century
counterparts. The YMCA is one notable exception. The organization has maintained extensive membership and national scale,
145
while maintaining significant face-to-face opportunities. To date,
however, its political potential has remained largely untapped.
That said, a few local YMCA chapters have ventured into encouraging voter registration.
Those groups that have maintained a political presence at a national scale, such as the AARP, National Rifle Association (NRA),
and Sierra Club, are often hybrids—combining a membership association that includes face-to-face participatory opportunities with
146
a D.C. policy-based shop run by professional staff. It is striking
that, as with their predecessors, these groups generally include a
recreational element.
The Sierra Club, for example, has two national offices and 27
147
regional offices. In 2003, it had a membership of 750,000, orga148
nized in 62 chapters with 343 local groups. Most distinctively, the
national board of directors is elected by the membership at large,
and each chapter is governed by an executive committee that includes representatives from each local group. Local groups, in
turn, have their own elected executive committees. In all, there are
149
12,500 leadership posts, including 10,000 at the local level. Even
with proportionately low levels of face-to-face participation, the organization is able to cultivate civic leadership skills and to motivate
a respectable number of members to participate in internal elec144.
Founded in 1991, the Kensington Welfare Rights Union is a social justice group of,
by, and for the poor and homeless in Philadelphia. Kensington Welfare Rights Union, ENV’T
RES. FOUND., http://www.rachel.org/?q=en/node/128 (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). The National Lawyers Guild, a democratically structured, member-driven, federated organization
was founded in 1937. The League of Women Voters was founded in the wake of the 19th
Amendment. It was originally a collection of suffrage groups. Currently, it has 50,000 members and leagues in all 50 states. Still, it has struggled to maintain active membership and
recruit new members. See La Piana Consulting, Assessment and Transformation Map: League of
Women Voters (2018), http://www.lwvgt.org/files/LWV_Transformation_Roadmap_1.8.17_
rev.pdf.
145.
GRACE BUDRYS, HOW NONPROFITS WORK: CASE STUDIES IN NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 76–78 (2012) (profiling the social welfare work of the Chicago Y, including
the provision of 1,500 single occupancy rooms, while noting that nationally, as of 2008, the
YMCA had 20.9 million dues-paying members in 2,687 local chapters).
146.
Cf. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 91, at 194 (noting that “organizations with
many members may be heeded just as rapidly as organizations able to make large campaign
contributions” insofar as membership at scale both confers legitimacy and poses an electoral
threat).
147.
Andrews et al., supra note 143, at 1203. The Sierra Club was founded in 1892, but its
membership grew, in three main waves, after World War II.
148.
Id. at 1204.
149.
Id. at 1195, 1218–19.
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150

tions. Meanwhile, dues are distributed back to chapters based on
their membership levels, and local groups have control over their
151
programing.
Unions are the only genuine exception to this trend. For one,
despite significant declines in membership, they continue to be
remarkably effective at boosting voter turnout, especially among
152
low- and middle-income Americans. Indeed, “[a]mong high
school drop outs in the private sector, union members’ probability
of voting is 11 percentage points higher than for otherwise similar
153
non-members.”
States with higher concentrations of union
154
membership also tend to have higher voter turnout rates. Additionally, union members tend to join more civic associations and to
155
encourage nonunion family members to vote.
Unfortunately, the steep decline in unionism in the private sector undercuts unions’ ability to serve as a bulwark for non-college
educated Americans’ political and economic interests. Changes in
the American economy as well as legal policies have led to the con156
centration of union membership in the public sector. This significantly undermines the equalizing political effect of unionism because public-sector workers are generally better educated and less
157
in political need of the union-effect.
Until there is a revival in private-sector unionism or its equiva158
lent, the ability of contemporary unions to provide a political
150.
Id. at 1204, 1218 (estimating that only about 20% of members partake in face-toface opportunities and finding, inter alia, that member engagement is closely associated with
the number of core activists as well as their choice of programming).
151.
Id. at 1204–05.
152.
Sean McElwee, How Unions Boost Democratic Participation, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 16,
2015), https://prospect.org/article/how-unions-boost-democratic-participation (noting that
52% of union workers voted in the 2014 midterm, compared to 39% of non-union workers);
ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 163, 173 (noting that, other than churches, unions are the only organizations capable of drawing out non-elite voters on a large scale and further that union vote effects are largest for the least educated).
153.
ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 173 (noting that “[f]urther up the educational spectrum, the gap in turnout differentials shrinks” but that “the union vote premium among
private-sector college graduates is nearly twice the public-sector premium”).
154.
Benjamin Radcliff & Patricia Davis, Labor Organizations and Electoral Participation in
Industrial Democracies, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 132, 135, 137 (2000) (finding an approximately
6.5% increase in turnout as levels of unionization become significant and reporting that this
is approximately the same effect due to a higher educated electorate).
155.
McElwee, supra note 152 (reporting that “individuals living in a union household
are 2.5 points more liked to vote and register” after controlling for other factors).
156.
Cf. ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 64–67, 164–70 & fig. 7.1 (showing that in 1973, less
than twenty percent of union members worked in the public sector whereas, by 2009, they
comprised the majority); see also id. at 43–45, 67–68 (arguing that there are structural limits
to how much growth is possible in public-sector jobs and how these limits also explain why
the union-wage premium for public-sector members is 18%, significantly lower than in the
private sector).
157.
Id.
158.
See, e.g., Rest. Law Ctr. v. N. Y. C., 360 F. Supp. 3d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018). But see Memorandum from Jayme
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counterweight to the interests of economic elites is significantly
limited. Public-sector unionism—even if it manages to survive the
current Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment
and the concerted attacks it is facing from conservatives—cannot
serve these same equalizing functions because most public-sector
union workers are significantly more privileged than the union
159
members of the past. The political effects of public-sector unions
largely accrue to college-educated Americans—teachers, firefighters, and police. These middle and upper-middle class, collegeeducated workers also need organizational help in our current political environment, but their successes are unlikely to address the
160
needs of non-college educated workers.
3. The Political Consequences of the
New Configuration of Civil Society
Like unions, mid-twentieth-century civic associations drew political strength from their social networks and governance structures.
Face-to-face participation created strong social ties, capable of
generating time-consuming and substantial political action, while
associational breadth derived from their socioeconomically integrated membership enhanced their capacity for effective political
mobilization. Meanwhile, their governance structures solved a host
of problems that modern grassroots community organizations face
161
relating to scale and sustainability.

L. Sophir, Associate General Counsel Division of Advice, to Jill Coffman, Regional Director
Region 20 (Apr. 17, 2019); see also Lee, supra note 25.
159.
Largely in recognition of the effectiveness of unions in politics, conservatives have
been on a mission to undermine the ability of workers, particularly public-sector workers, to
unionize. Funded by the Koch network and facilitated by the American Legislative Exchange Council, a host of state legislatures, including in states where public support for public-sector unions was high, have significantly curtailed their power. See generally Theda
Skocpol & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, The Koch Network and Republican Party Extremism, 14
PERSP. ON POL. 681, 693–94 (2016); Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Basic Facts: New Conservative Strategies to Weaken America’s Public Sector Unions, SSN (Oct. 18, 2015),
https://scholars.org/brief/new-conservative-strategies-weaken-americas-public-sectorunions. Not satisfied with these legislative wins, however, conservative interests constitutionalized their gains. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2484–86 (2018).
160.
ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 7 (arguing that given their membership unions are no
longer capable of “providing [non-college educated workers] with resources and training to
engage in politics and translating their political activity into support for policies that benefited average workers”).
161.
Cf. HOLLIE RUSSON GILMAN & K. SABEEL RAHMAN, BUILDING CIVIC CAPACITY IN AN
ERA OF DEMOCRATIC CRISIS 3 (2017), https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/
documents/Building_Civic_Capacity_in_an_Era_of_Democratic_Crisis.pdf (noting that any
effort to increase civic capacity at the grassroots will need to address problems of scale and
sustainability).
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The political power of this organizational form is evident in the
role played by such groups in the passage of the most generous redistributive federal programs in American policymaking, from Social Security and Medicare, to the Civil Rights Act and the Voting
162
Rights Act. The G.I. Bill—the single greatest economic equalizer
for white men and a critical catalyst for the leadership in the Civil
Rights movement—was the brainchild of the American Legion,
163
which was involved in its drafting after World War II. Many such
groups were also vital to growing and sustaining key social move164
ments of the period. At the same time, unions worked to counter
the efforts of business on a variety of fronts, including the mini165
mum wage.
The political consequences of the demise of this civic configuration have been profound. Newly professionalized and dependent
on foundations for funding, national organizations have eschewed
166
political mobilization in favor of litigation and lobbying. Moreover, these policy shops frequently “gravitate toward upper-middle167
class constituencies” and their policy priorities, to the neglect of
168
policies that would benefit disadvantaged constituents.
With these changes, everyday Americans have lost political power. In the absence of effective organization, their votes have be169
come a weak counterweight to the political power money buys. A
significant factor in this regard has been the demise of meaningful
membership. As previously discussed, recruitment is central to
both individual mobilization and collective success. Moreover, as it

162.
See Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 183–85 (reviewing the literature).
163.
METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 18–22 (describing how the
American Legion utilized its grassroots network to generate widespread support for its generous bill and to overcome modest ambitions of Roosevelt administration’s proposal).
164.
Andrews et al., supra note 143, at 1192 (observing that a third of the 47 federated
civic groups with membership of 1% or more of the U.S. population at any point between
1776 and 1940 were critical to major social movements of the period) (citing Theda Skocpol
et al., A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Volunteerism in the United States, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 527, 529 (2000)).
165.
HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 23, at 140; Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 115; see also
Sachs, supra note 22, at 169–71 (reviewing literature on historic political power of unions).
166.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 224 (noting decision to eschew civic education and political mobilization).
167.
Id. at 224.
168.
Dara Z. Strolovitch, Do Interest Groups Represent the Disadvantaged? Advocacy at the Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender, 68 J. AM. POl. 894, 904–05 (2006) (finding, in particular,
that organizations consistently underestimate the benefits of policies that most affect disadvantaged subgroups).
169.
Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 120 (noting that organizations that “have no mass
membership . . . to mobilize . . . do little to draw broader coalitions of middle- and lowerincome citizens into electoral and legislative processes”); accord Sachs, supra note 22, at 167
(noting that “organization, like wealth, is itself a source of political power”).
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happens, Americans are most likely to be recruited into politics
170
through connections formed in civic associations.
Thus, in the absence of fraternity, contemporary civic groups,
including those that remain federated, are at a significant disadvantage when they do seek to generate the kind of political activity
that is necessary to hold elected officials accountable. Doug
McAdam’s seminal study of the Freedom Rides was probably the
first to draw attention to this point: by comparing accepted applicants to the Freedom Rides, he found that prior personal connections, not ideological commitments, distinguished those who ulti171
mately participated from those who applied but failed to turn up.
More recently, in The Making of Pro-Life Activists, Ziad W. Munson
shows how the path to pro-life activism (including the picketing of
clinics) cannot be explained by either demographics or ideological
beliefs, but is instead the product of “organizational and relational
172
ties.” Indeed, almost a quarter of the activists he interviewed con170.
VERBA ET AL., supra note 117, at 144, 157 (concluding, more broadly, that nonpolitical institutions are significant generators of civic and political engagement, inter alia, “because those who are affiliated with these institutions develop the personal networks from
which requests for activity often spring”); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 48 (reporting
that those who participate in membership organizations, regardless of whether they are affirmatively political, are more likely to take part in politics); see also Chaeyoon Lim, Social
Networks and Political Participation: How Do Networks Matter, 87 SOCIAL FORCES 961, 967–68,
970–71, 973 (2008) (finding that in second-wave Citizen Participation Study “[a]ssociational
ties [were] the most common channels of recruitment” for the three types of political activities studied and that a direct, personal connection to a recruiter significantly explained decisions to contact government officials or participate in community politics, in particular,
doubling the likelihood of successful recruitment); Dietlind Stolle & Thomas R. Rochon, Are
All Associations Alike? Member Diversity, Associational Type, and the Creation of Social Capital, in
BEYOND TOCQUEVILLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SOCIAL CAPITAL DEBATE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 143, 144, 151 (reporting findings that membership in leisure groups resulted in
political participation 60% of the time but raising questions about whether groups organized around exclusion would do the same).
171.
See, e.g., Doug McAdam, Recruitment to High Risk Activism: The Case of the Freedom
Summer, 92 AM. J. SOC. 64 (1986) (finding that notwithstanding similar levels of time and
motivation, participants in the 1964 Freedom Summer had deeper personal and organizational connections to the Civil Rights movement); see also Doug McAdam & Ronnelle
Paulsen, Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism, 99 AM. J. SOC. 640, 656–60
(1993) (reanalyzing the data and concluding that political commitments had to be reinforced by social ties formed in organizations before it yielded high-risk activism, and further,
that continued contact with activist friends from the Civil Rights movement sustained activism and political engagement over the long term).
172.
ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT
MOBILIZATION WORKS 20, 44 (2008). Munson’s findings are based on, inter alia, observations
of and in-depth interviews with anti-abortion “activists and nonactivists” as his goal was to
explain why many individuals with pro-life commitments “nonetheless remain uninvolved in
any sustained way.” Id. Summarizing his research for a popular audience, Munson explains:
“pro-life activism begins not because of any epiphany . . . about the evils of abortion—but
because [individuals] bump[] into someone already in the pro-life movement . . . a friend,
neighbor, or work colleague in the course of an ordinary day” and accept their invitation to
go to an anti-abortion activity. Ziad W. Munson, Key Findings Brief: How People Become ProLife Activists, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Feb. 8, 2016), https://scholars.org/brief/howpeople-become-pro-life-activists; see also Valerie A Lewis et al., Religion, Networks, and Neighbor-
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sidered themselves to be pro-choice at the time of their initial foray
into the movement, while many more were ambivalent or unclear
173
about their pro-life commitments.
Tellingly, the heavyweights among contemporary civic associations have largely held onto critical features that made midtwentieth century associations so politically powerful: meaningful
membership, opportunities for face-to-face association, federated
structures, democratic governance, and socioeconomic integration. Most also include a significant recreational or nonpolitical
draw. They are, however, the exceptions rather than the norm.
The AARP’s political muscle derives from its nearly 38 million
members, who contribute over $295 million in membership dues
each year and who vote regularly and at higher rates than other
174
age groups on Election Day. Equally importantly, its membership
includes many non-elite seniors, enabling it to operate as “a mass
membership organization . . . through which the influence of less
175
well-off Americans flows.” While the vast majority of its members
simply write a $16 check to the organization to receive a variety of
discounts as well as its magazine, which covers both lifestyle and
political news, between 500,000 and 1.9 million members are active
176
in its 1,300 local chapters. These chapters advertise themselves as
opportunities for newly relocated or widowed members to make
new friends, while also pursuing civic-minded projects with others.
In recent years, the organization has sought to increase its state
and local presence in innovative ways. To that end, the AARP participated in rebuilding communities in New Orleans, including by
177
training local activists and by organizing all-ages walking groups.
Although the AARP is a stalwart advocate for the interests of sen-

liness: The Impact of Religious Social Networks on Civic Engagement, 42 SOC. SCI. RES. 331, 339–40
(2013) (finding that “those who attend religious services more often are more likely to engage in civic activities and informal helping not because of belief, politics, or general sociability, but because they have strong religious social networks”).
173.
MUNSON, supra note 172, at 6 (“My data show that many individuals who become
activists are at best ambivalent, and in many cases decidedly pro-choice, in their views on
abortion before getting involved. Their views change during the actual process of becoming
activists.”); see also id. at 33–35, 43 (describing these individuals’ representations about their
prior beliefs and observing that “[a]lmost half of all activists in my sample did not hold prolife beliefs prior to their involvement in the pro-life movement”).
174.
See Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 189. See generally MARK NOVAK, ISSUES IN AGING
(4th ed. 2018).
175.
Martin Gilens, Policy Consequences of Representational Inequality, in WHO GETS
REPRESENTED? 247, 248, 272–74 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011).
176.
CHRISTINE L. DAY, AARP: AMERICA’S LARGEST INTEREST GROUP AND ITS IMPACT 41
(2017) (describing levels of active participation).
177.
AARP, Consolidated Financial Statements Together with Report of Independent
Certified Public Accountants (2016), https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/about_
aarp/annual_reports/2017/form-990-2016-aarp.pdf (representing just under 20 percent of
its annual operating revenue).
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iors, its internal governance structures do not offer individual
members much voice. Indeed, in 2001, the AARP, which in many
respects operates as a large business, revised its bylaws to end elec178
tions for its Board. Still, the AARP is an effective organization
when it comes to both mobilizing seniors and, arguably more im179
portantly, identifying legislative opportunities that benefit them.
Equally importantly, it is not the only organization working effec180
tively on behalf of seniors.
Originally founded in 1871, the NRA did not grow its sizeable
membership until the 1950s, despite significant and ongoing fed181
eral subsidies. Today, the NRA is well-known for having effectively integrated a lobbying-focused D.C. headquarters (heavily funded
by gun manufacturers) with a network of local gun clubs present in
182
every state. By some estimates, its membership tops 3 million.
NRA membership comes with opportunities to socialize, complementary lifestyle and political magazines, effective voter guides,
183
and political education. Perhaps most conspicuously, NRA members have been found to be demonstrably more politically active
184
than gun owners who do not belong to the NRA. Like the AARP,
178.
DAY, supra note 176, at 36, 41.
179.
CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 77–78 (noting, in particular, that “AARP members are
more likely than nonmembers to contact elected officials and to contact them about Social
Security specifically” and why this pattern is most likely the result of mobilization).
180.
Id. at 76 (identifying the National Council of Senior Citizens as another key political advocacy).
181.
ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 69–73 (2d ed. 1998) (recounting decades of direct and substantial federal financial support to the NRA, as well as the organization’s early efforts to affiliate with 2000 local sporting clubs, which grew its membership from 3,500 to 50,000, while noting that it was not until after the war that its
membership exploded).
182.
The NRA is notoriously unwilling to share reliable information about its membership, and although it reports having around 5.5 million dues paying members, it has been
accused of exaggerating its numbers. See, e.g., Alex Yablon, New NRA Tax Filing Shows Membership Revenues Dropped by $47 Million Following Sandy Hook Surge, TRACE (Jan. 23, 2016),
https://www.thetrace.org/2016/01/nra-membership-drop/ (explaining controversy about
exact membership roll but also noting organization receives about $175 million in membership dues annually); accord Christopher Ingraham, NRA Membership Is Up Since Parkland Killings, Group’s Magazine Subscriptions Suggest, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/09/19/magazine-numbers-suggest-nrahas-added-hundreds-thousands-new-members/.
183.
See Grades and Endorsements, NRA-PVF: POL. VICTORY FUND, https://www.nrapvf.org/
grades/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (announcing endorsements and candidate ratings in
hundreds of federal and state races); NRA-ILA: INST. LEGIS. ACTION,
https://www.nraila.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (providing up-to-date alerts on elected
officials’ positions on gun-related issues and providing news regarding state and federal legislative activity); SPITZER, supra note 181, at 75 (noting NRA’s extraordinary expenditures as
compared to other groups “on internal communication designed not only to buttress support for the NRA but to rally support for political candidates sympathetic to the NRA perspective”).
184.
According to a 2017 Pew study, approximately 46% of gun owners in the NRA report having contacted a public official to express their opinion on gun policy; 24% said they
had done so in the past 12 months. By contrast, only 15% of gun owners who do not belong
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the NRA’s political strengths are a product of the size of its membership, its organizational structure, and the connections it has de185
veloped to elected officials. It does not, however, promote internal democratic governance, and it accepts significant donations
186
from wealthy individuals.
***
In sum, the weakness of contemporary civil society as an engine
for the broad interests of the electorate goes well beyond the absence of representation. It also lies in the form of that representation. The organizations that do exist to represent Main Street have
grown weaker on the exact same axes that best support effective
political participation: socioeconomic integration, interpersonal
depth, and participatory federated governance structures.
Taken together, the three trends discussed in this section promote a vicious political cycle of disorganization, demobilization,
and disengagement. The collapse of private-sector unions has further fed both the economic and political inequality of the New
187
Gilded Age. When combined with the atrophying of active membership in all forms, it has led to significant democratic disengagement—affecting both the sorts of policies that are adopted
and, perhaps more importantly, who has a place at the table when
those policies are conceived and prioritized. The result, as Skocpol
explains, is a political configuration in which everyday citizens
struggle to be heard:
If contemporary America’s top-heavy civic world encourages doing-for rather than doing-with, it limits popular mobilization and promotes trivial polarizations in politics, and

to the NRA report they have ever reached out to a public figure regarding gun policy, and
just 5% report having done so in the past 12 months. Kim Parker, Among Gun Owners, NRA
Members Have a Unique Set of Views and Experiences, PEW RES. CTR. (July 5, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/05/among-gun-owners-nra-members-havea-unique-set-of-views-and-experiences/.
185.
SPITZER, supra note 181, at 77–83 (naming the six Presidents and several congressional leaders who were members).
186.
See Jay Willis, Could the NRA Be Taken Over from the Inside?, GQ (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.gq.com/story/nra-takeover-bylaws-leadership (explaining how the organization has carefully used its “bylaws to restrict the franchise to a small, insular, and carefullycurated group of this country’s gun owners” in order to undermine the voice of its members, nearly three-quarters of whom, for example, support background checks).
187.
ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 183 (noting that demise of private-sector unions has
“reconfigured the electorate by reducing the political voice of those lacking a college education”).
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it also skews national politics and public policy making to188
ward the values and interests of the privileged.
Similarly, Robert D. Putnam observes that as more “people skip the
meeting[s]” where local policy decisions are made, these policies
189
grow less and less reflective of median interests.
The political consequences have been particularly acute for the
many working- and middle-class Americans who have concrete
needs—from workers without a college degree, to working parents,
to communities that depend on Medicaid and CHIP or bear the
190
burdens of mass incarceration. In the absence of effective organization, these individuals and communities are unable to penetrate
the “upper-class accent” of the heavenly chorus of Washington in191
terest groups.
II. LAW AND THE SHAPING OF CIVIC AND POLITICAL CAPACITY
And still, the political tides appear to be changing. Writing in
the early 2000s, Putnam lamented that a growing deficit in social
capital had resulted in significant declines in all forms of political
participation—from voter turnout, to attendance at political rallies
192
and public meetings, to running for office. Schlozman, Verba,
and Brady similarly bemoaned “an uninterrupted downward trend
in overall activity” during the period from 1972 to 2002, including
“attending a public meeting on town or school affairs,” “signing a
petition,” “working for a political party,” and “holding or running
193
for a political office.” This has recently shifted.
Political engagement has been on the rise for the last decade.
For a start, voter turnout has been steadily rising since 2008. Indeed, turnout during presidential elections is rapidly approaching
194
that of the mid-twentieth century. The trajectory of voter partici-

188.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 236.
189.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 342 (“When most people skip the meeting[s]” where local policy decisions are made, “those who are left tend to be more extreme,
because they care most about the outcome.”).
190.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 344, 346 (noting the absence of groups for
“parents of children in Head Start programs, women at home, office receptionists, Wal-Mart
associates, criminal defendants awaiting trial, recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families benefits or food stamps, [and] parking lot attendants”).
191.
Id. at 346.
192.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 35 (arguing that “[d]eclining electoral
participation is merely the most visible symptom of a broader disengagement from community life”).
193.
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 162–63.
194.
Presidential election turnout peaked in 1960 at nearly 64%. The 2008 presidential
election brought out almost 62% of the electorate. National General Election VEP Turnout
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pations in midterm elections is harder to gauge: the 2014 midterm
election saw the lowest levels of turnout since 1942 with an esti195
mated 36.6% of eligible voters showing up to vote. Turnout in
196
the 2018 midterm, however, was the highest in nearly a century.
This fresh political energy extends beyond voting. The election
of Donald Trump triggered an unexpected and unprecedented
197
level of political engagement and organization. A staggering and
unexpected 3.2 million Americans joined in the Women’s March
to resist President Trump’s messages of xenophobia, sexism, racism, scientific skepticism, and official corruption on the day of his
198
inauguration—at least half a million in Washington, D.C. itself.
The Women’s March turned out to be just the beginning. According to a 2018 Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation poll, one
in five Americans report participating in a street protest or political
199
rally since 2016.
Nor has recent political engagement been limited to demonstrations or confined to resisting President Trump’s political agenda.
Remarkably, over 6,000 grassroots political groups have been
formed to oppose President Trump’s policies, many organized by
200
middle-class women. We have also seen a wave of teachers’ strikes
and protests in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, Colorado,
201
North Carolina, and Kentucky. This engagement followed on a
Rates, 1789–Present, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/national-1789present (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
195.
Editorial Board, Opinion, The Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/opinion/the-worst-voter-turnout-in-72years.html.
196.
Mira Rojanasakul et al., Americans Actually Voted in the 2018 Midterms, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-midterm-election-turnoutshifts/.
197.
See Mark Blumenthal & Erin Pinkus, Poll Finds Surge of Political Activism on the Left,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/poll-findssurge-of-political-activism-on-the-left_us_58daad61e4b0ae61844c0706 (reporting on polls
seeking to quantify the flurry of political activities in the early months of the Trump administration).
198.
Erica Chenoweth & Jeremy Pressman, This Is What We Learned by Counting the Women’s Marches, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/02/07/this-is-what-we-learned-by-counting-the-womensmarches/?utm_term=.3e94884961ca (noting marches took place in 653 locations).
199.
Jordan & Clement, supra note 72.
200.
See Peter Dreier, The Anti-Trump Movement: Recover, Resist, Reform—The Profusion of
Citizen Organizing as a Defense—and Offense, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://prospect.org/article/anti-trump-movement-recover-resist-reform-0.; David Pozen,
The Tax-Code Shift That’s Changing Liberal Activism, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/501c3-501c4-activists-and-taxcode/576364/.
201.
E.g., Rivka Galchen, The Teacher’s Strike and the Democratic Revival in Oklahoma, NEW
YORKER (May 28, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/04/the-teachersstrike-and-the-democratic-revival-in-oklahoma; see also Valerie Strauss, A New Public Education
Movement Is Emerging in Wisconsin, a Rebuke to Gov. Walker’s War on Labor and School Privatization, WASH. POST (July 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
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decade of grassroots mobilization around an array of issues ranging from income inequality, to police shootings as symbols of endemic racial bias, to the development and transportation of natu202
ral gas.
Finally, several policies that would address the concerns of many
working- and middle-class families have been placed back on the
policy agenda. These include raising the minimum wage, government-guaranteed medical coverage, universal pre-K, and free college tuition.
The central question, then, is how to harness this newfound political energy to rebuild a civil society capable of providing an effective counterweight to the political power derived from economic capital. There is obviously no going back. Economic, social, and
cultural transformations, along with advances in technology, preclude the possibility (and desirability) of returning to the past. The
appeal of sex- and race-segregated membership-based civic associations has significantly waned (thankfully), and the route to political power no longer runs through ethnic, religious, and veterans’
203
groups. Still, the fact that there is no way back does not mean
that there is no way forward.
The critical first step in seeing the possibilities for positive
change is to begin to understand the complex interface between
law and civil society. The robust associational life of the midtwentieth century was not happenstance: it was the product of New
Deal policymaking. Indeed, the political energy of seniors today,
including those of average socioeconomic status, like the political
204
power of the AARP, is not simply fortuitous. It is a direct result of
the fact that Social Security and Medicare—programs that are visible, generous, universal for those eligible, and well-managed—
have not been scaled back, unlike many other New Deal pro205
grams. By the same token, the present participatory and organizational inequalities that impede the ability of low- and middleincome Americans to resist the political sway of elites and superelites are a byproduct of the form that both regulation and deregulation have taken since the 1980s. In political science jargon, this
phenomenon is known as a policy feedback.
sheet/wp/2018/07/03/a-new-public-education-movement-is-emerging-in-wisconsin-arebuke-to-gov-walkers-war-on-labor-and-school-privatization/?utm_term=.cb827bd1f883.
202.
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Defining Nonviolence as a Matter of Law and Politics, in LXII
NOMOS: PROTEST AND DISSENT (Melissa Schwartzberg, ed. 2019) (forthcoming) (manuscript
on file with author).
203.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 113.
204.
See CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 14–15, 32–37, 65–79.
205.
See Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 112–15 (noting the ways in which the repeal of
social programs benefitting citizens of average to below average means “have worked to reverse their civic and political incorporation”).
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The basic insight (empirically verified in study after study) is
that policymaking has second-order effects on citizens’ attitudes
about and relations to democracy—effects that can either instill
206
civic and political engagement or breed endemic apathy. The
specific direction of the policy feedback depends not only on the
quality (e.g., generous vs. stingy, universal vs. means-tested, equitable vs. preferential) but also on the form (visible vs. invisible, rational vs. arbitrary, well-managed vs. dysfunctional) of the policies
207
implemented.
The recognition of policy feedbacks, which has dominated certain sectors of political science, has important underappreciated
implications for good governance reformers. Foremost, it suggests
that public policy choices, as instantiated in legislation, will inevitably play a role in either reversing or reinforcing the current trajectory of civil society and, hence, democracy.
A. Virtuous Democratic Policy Feedbacks
The virtuous democratic circle from civic and political participation to policy responsiveness to the white middle-class in the midtwentieth century was itself a byproduct of the form of New Deal
208
governance. At the time—frequently at the behest of the very civic associations that fostered political engagement and participation—Washington chose to provide ample benefits to large swaths
of American society. The Social Security Act, like the G.I. Bill,
doled out generous benefits to many ordinary Americans in highly
209
visible ways with significant democratic returns.
Over the years, many have praised the generation that entered
adulthood during World War II for their extraordinary civic and
political engagement. Veterans of World War II liberally joined organizations and clubs over the course of their lives and have been
210
extoled for their high levels of civic participation. And yet, this
206.
See infra notes 212–228 & 245–260 and accompanying text.
207.
See Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 183–97 (reviewing studies of the policy feedbacks
of a range of New Deal programs and identifying the War on Poverty as the least effective in
empowering its beneficiaries over the long term).
208.
See id. at 196–97.
209.
See CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 65–66, 92 (explicating the policy feedback cycle of
the expansion of Social Security for seniors); Suzanne Mettler, Bringing the State Back in to
Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 351, 359, 361 (2002) [hereinafter Mettler, Bringing the State Back] (summarizing how
the G.I. Bill affected participants and why elevated levels of civic and political engagement
among its beneficiaries cannot be attributed simply to their raised educational or socioeconomic status).
210.
METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 107, 122 (finding veterans who
had used the G.I. Bill reported 50% more memberships in civic and political organizations
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enhanced democratic engagement cannot be attributed simply to
military service, as veterans of subsequent wars “have not been
211
more active in civic affairs than [similarly situated] nonveterans.”
What then explains the unique civic engagement of World War
II veterans? The answer to this puzzle lies in the G.I. Bill itself. Suzanne Mettler, in her seminal work on the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1943 (aka the G.I. Bill), finds that its education and
training provisions had an overwhelmingly positive effect on male
veterans’ civic involvement. The effect proved significant even after
controlling for all sorts of individual attributes, most importantly,
212
parental civic and political engagement and advanced education.
The effect, moreover, was not reducible to the increased education
or the enhanced socioeconomic status of beneficiaries resulting
213
from their education. And the effect was most pronounced for
214
beneficiaries from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and for
215
those who took advantage of access to sub-college programs.
In sum, critical to the program’s success were three factors that
communicated civic respect: generosity of benefits, virtually uni216
versal access for men, and smooth administration. Mettler concludes:

and that despite the fact that most of these groups’ “primary purpose was not first and
foremost political,” involvement “did help to politicize citizens and draw them closer to the
political process”); Mettler, Bringing the State Back, supra note 209, at 357–59, 361 (reporting
that “use of the G.I. Bill for education,” independent of attained educational level, “proved
to be a significant positive determinant of . . . participation in a wide range of political organizational memberships and activities,” while emphasizing its “pronounced impact on civic engagement among veterans from less advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds”).
211.
METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 5 (reviewing relevant studies
comparing civic engagement of veterans to nonveterans).
212.
Id. at 107 (finding that “veterans who used the G.I. Bill’s education and training
provisions became especially active citizens in the postwar era,” where political activity was
defined broadly to include membership in political organizations from clubs to party committees, as well as contacting officials, campaigns, running for local office, contributing
money, and protesting).
213.
Id. at 108 (finding that “the G.I. Bill’s effect on civic involvement was not reducible
simply to the formal education or improved socioeconomic status that it promoted” given
that “even among veterans who had the same level of education, those who had used the
G.I. Bill became members of more such organizations).
214.
Id. at 112 (noting that G.I. Bill usage significantly boosted “the rate of joining civic
organizations among those from low-medium and medium standards of living in childhood”).
215.
Id. at 114 (noting that “use of the G.I. Bill for subcollege programs functioned as an
especially powerful and significant determinant of both veterans’ civic memberships and
their political involvement in the postwar era, even more so than use of the higher education benefits”).
216.
Id. at 10, 59, 106. On universality, it is important to note that after World War II,
80% of men were military veterans and those veterans were broadly representative of the
U.S. population because of the draft. Id. at 7. As such, 51% of young men took advantage of
the program. Id.; see also id. at 6–7 (describing the generosity of the program, which included, among other things, stipends adjusted for marital status).
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Through the program’s inclusive design, its fair manner of
implementation, and its transformative socioeconomic effects, it communicated to beneficiaries that government was for
and about people like them, and thus it incorporated them
more fully as citizens. Beneficiaries responded by embracing the duties and obligations of active citizenship. Such effects were most pronounced . . . among particular groups
whose inclusion signified the expansion of social oppor217
tunity.
For African-American recipients, in particular, the G.I. Bill was
their first positive experience with American government and
stood in stark contrast to the rest of their experiences, including
218
military service. Many, in turn, became early leaders within the
219
civil rights movement.
The G.I. Bill was not alone. In all, the visible and generous government programs of the mid-twentieth century communicated a
sense that beneficiaries mattered as citizens while stimulating in220
terest in government. In doing so, they promoted a positive policy feedback—one that fostered political participation and civic en221
gagement, while “elevat[ing] the collective political capacities of
222
low- and middle-income Americans” in particular. Even the
means-tested Aid to Families with Dependent Children program,
through its generosity, proved capable of building political capaci223
ty among its beneficiaries.
Equally importantly, the New Deal programs created incentives
to organize. These incentives existed both from the bottom up and
224
the top down. The very existence of beneficiaries creates an incentive to form groups. It has long been recognized, for instance,
that Social Security, like agricultural subsidies, incentivized the
217.
Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
218.
Id. at 11, 119.
219.
Id.
220.
Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 111–12 (emphasizing the importance of the ways
New Deal programs “presented citizens with visible evidence of their collective stake in government outputs and political processes”).
221.
See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 46–55 (concluding that “Social Security both
raises and democratizes senior participation; compared with that of the rest of the population senior citizens’ political participation is less unequal because of low-income seniors’
greater activity with regard to Social Security”). Similarly, farmers, as the beneficiaries of
New Deal agricultural subsidies, have an unusually high turnout rate in elections. Mettler,
Bringing the State Back, supra note 209, at 352.
222.
Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 111–12; see also Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 157–
58.
223.
Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 182.
224.
See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 70–79 (providing an overview of the history of
mobilization by political parties and interest groups in the wake of the passage and expansion of Social Security).
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formation of the AARP, the American Farm Bureau Federation,
225
and the National Farmers Union. The public participation built
into various environmental statutes passed in the 1970s offers the
226
most recent illustration of the creation of bottom up incentives.
As for top down incentives, there is little question that existing political elites frequently find it in their interest to organize and mobilize beneficiaries of federal programs in their efforts to win of227
fice. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the federated
structure of civic associations in the nineteenth century was a
product of the changed expanse of federal policymaking, particu228
larly for veterans in the wake of the Civil War.
B. Vicious Democratic Policy Feedbacks
By the same token, the vicious democratic circle in which disorganization breeds unequal political participation and even less policy responsiveness can be attributed to the policy feedbacks of
lawmaking since the 1980s. Despite the rhetorical antipathy to government “handouts,” lawmaking in the post-Reagan era has not
taken government out of the business of doling out largesse. It is
just that the largesse is now undertaken through tax policy, rather
than direct support, and is directed toward corporations, wealthy
individuals, and home-owning professionals employed by large
companies.
The new preference for distributing monetary benefits through
tax incentives has been dubbed the “submerged” or “hidden” wel229
fare state. Hidden in the complexity of the tax code, this form of
225.
Id. at 75–79 (explaining how “senior interest groups are both effects and causes in
the participatory cycle” and emphasizing that “[s]enior mass membership groups did not
create Social Security policy” but “[r]ather, the policy helped create the groups”). See generally Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 111–12 (summarizing evidence that “[t]he . . . welfare
state . . . stimulated the growth of organizations that recruited people into politics”).
226.
See Kenneth T. Andrews & Bob Edwards, The Organizational Structure of Local Environmentalism, 10 MOBILIZATION 213, 215 (2005) (noting that “[e]nvironmental advocacy has
developed alongside the growth and transformation of state institutions”).
227.
See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 74 (concluding analysis of evidence of political
parties’ increased attention to seniors over the course of twentieth century by observing that
“[w]ithout Social Security, there is no constituency to appeal to, just an age group . . . divided by other cleavages and interests”).
228.
See Jocelyn Elise Crowley & Theda Skocpol, The Rush to Organize: Explaining Associational Formation in the United States, 1860s-1920s, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 813, 815 (2001); Theda
Skocpol et al., A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United
States, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 527, 532–34 (2000).
229.
Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 803, 804–05 (2010) [hereinafter Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State] (defining the “submerged state” as one in which “policies . . . lay beneath the surface of US [sic] market institutions and within the federal tax system”); see also
Mettler, Transformed Welfare State, supra note 40, at 193, 202–03 (explaining how with one
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policymaking renders its regressive qualities invisible to the public
and its beneficiaries invisible to themselves. While legislators, public policy experts, and tax lawyers understand that the homemortgage interest deduction and the Earned Income Tax credit
constitute benefits with redistributive effects not unlike Social Security or Medicaid, most Americans are confounded by the tax
code. As such, even the beneficiaries of the hidden welfare state (at
least those who are not businesses) are unaware that government
230
has done anything for them. The story for businesses, discussed
below, is entirely different but in its own way exacerbates the vicious cycle.
The use of the tax code to make policy effectively obscures both
the redistribution of benefits and the beneficiaries of redistribution. The results of the Social and Governmental Issues and Participation Study of 2008 (2008 SGIPS) are especially revealing in this
regard. One thousand four hundred Americans were asked wheth231
er they had “ever used a government social program.” These initial responses were compared to answers about usage of nineteen
federal social policies, consciously chosen to include both entitle232
ment and tax programs. The vast majority of recipients of the
most salient entitlement programs (e.g., Social Security Disability,
Medicaid, Public Assistance, and Food Stamps) recognized that
233
they had been the beneficiaries of a government social program.
By contrast, over 50% of respondents who had used one of the six
policies of the submerged state reported that they had never “used
234
a government social program.” For example, 64.3% of those who
reported taking advantage of a 529 College Savings Plan or Coverdell Education Savings Account denied having ever used “a gov235
ernment social program.” Other visible entitlement programs fell
somewhere between these two extremes: 44.1% of recipients of Social Security Retirement benefits, 43.0% of Unemployment bene-

exception—the Earned Income Tax Credit—the hidden welfare state disproportionately
benefits the wealthiest Americans).
230.
See Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State, supra note 229, at 804 (noting that
“such policies . . . shroud[] the state’s role, making it largely invisible to most ordinary citizens, even [the] beneficiaries of existing policies”).
231.
The polling was conducted via a national telephone survey of a random sample of
1,000 Americans, with oversamples of 200 additional low-income Americans and 200 additional young Americans (aged 25–34). Id. at 808, 820 n.32.
232.
Id. at 808.
233.
Id. at 809 tbl.3 (noting that only 25.4%–28.7% of those who had used these entitlement programs failed to respond in the affirmative to the initial question).
234.
The submerged state programs within the list included: 529 College Savings Plan or
Coverdell Education Savings Account, Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, Hope or Lifetime Learning Tax Credit, Student Loans, Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, and the
Earned Income Tax Credit. Id.
235.
Id.
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fits, 40.3% of the G.I. Bill, and 39.8% of Medicare recipients re236
ported not having received government benefits.
This obfuscation would not matter if ordinary Americans did not
care about distributional effects, but they do. The 2008 SGIPS
found that when respondents received information explaining that
the benefits of the home mortgage interest deduction largely accrue to affluent households, “opposition grew sharply, particularly
among those with low to moderate incomes and among liberals
and Democrats,” whereas “support grew” for the Earned Income Tax
Credit when it was explained that it helped households with low to
237
moderate incomes. Indeed, it may not be an accident that politicians have opted to implement policies that disproportionately
benefit wealthier Americans through complicated tax incentives
that render those benefits invisible.
Invisibility with respect to both beneficiaries and effects has one
further democratic drawback: it makes it incredibly difficult to or238
ganize or be organized. As Joe Soss and Lawrence R. Jacobs observe, since the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, American policymaking has “fostered atomized publics with little sense of what
they have in common [or] . . . what is at stake in politics and gov239
ernment.”
The middle-class recipients of both the homemortgage interest deduction and subsidized employer-sponsored
health insurance do not see themselves as the beneficiaries of federal programs and are not organized to advocate on their behalf.
The corporations and industries that benefit from these programs are not, however, similarly blind. As Mettler observes, even
as the policy implications of the submerged state “elude[] most
ordinary citizens,” the submerged state “has fostered the profitability of particular industries and induced them to increase their po240
litical capacity . . . [in order] to maintain the status quo.” Indeed,
the invulnerability of the subsidization of homeownership and employer-sponsored health insurance is a product of industry interest
groups rather than the direct advocacy of the individual beneficiaries. In some cases, this virtual representation is adequate to protect
individual interest, but in most, it diverges. For example, federal
policy in the late twentieth century sought to make college more

236.
Id.
237.
Id. at 809.
238.
Id. at 805; Mettler, Transformed Welfare State, supra note 40, at 212–17.
239.
Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 110, 113 (attributing reduced policy capacity to the
increasingly prominent role of tax expenditures as the vehicle for social policy).
240.
Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State, supra note 229, at 803; see also id. at 806–
07, 811–13 (describing fights surrounding Obama’s early policy agenda and the economic
stakes for the financial, insurance, and real estate sectors and the beneficiaries of regressive
tax policies).
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affordable for middle-class families through subsidized, private educational loans—rather than distributing government support di241
rectly. The effect was to create an entrenched set of special interests opposed to any changes to the system, despite its well-known
economic inefficiencies, including self-dealing between lenders
and universities. In 2019, Congress changed the system to be more
generous to beneficiaries by making the federal government the
lender, but it was forced to make significant concessions to special
interests: the new federal loans are originated by private lenders,
242
who receive fees from the government for their services.
Taken together, changes to the form of policymaking since the
1980s have exacerbated the un-heavenliness of the chorus of political interest. Neoliberal policymaking has exacerbated political inequality not only as a matter of first-order policy preferences but also because of its second-order effects on the democratic engageengagement and political capacity of ordinary Americans. The
choice to distribute government largesse in a form that is invisible
to most Americans has produced two effects that intersect to enhance the political power of corporate and moneyed elites: it has
demobilized lower- and middle-income Americans, while simultaneously creating increased incentives for narrow business interests
to mobilize. The result is that ordinary Americans have been disempowered just as the incentives for corporate beneficiaries to organize in defense of their wins have increased.
To make matters worse, the scaling back of New Deal entitlement programs over the last thirty years has been partial and uneven, thereby further contributing to differential and unequal polit243
ical mobilization. Inroads into New Deal welfare policies as well
as the expansion of the criminal justice system have contributed to
the demobilization of the economically and racially marginalized,
in particular. In this regard, it matters to our story that Social Secu-

241.
In 1997, responding to the fact that federal grants were no longer keeping up with
rising costs in higher education, Congress introduced the generous Hope Scholarship and
Lifetime Learning Credit. In 2009, it upped the commitment appreciably with the adoption
of the American Opportunity Tax Credit (“AOTC”), which made these credits available to
significantly more households. See Scott A. Hodge & Kyle Pomerleau, Is the Tax Code the Proper Tool for Making Higher Education More Affordable? 220 TAX FOUND. 1, 3 (2014),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/SR220.pdf (reporting that, between 2008 and
2011, the number of taxpayers claiming educational tax credits jumped to 18 million from
about 7.7 million, while approximately 8 million Americans received a tax refund pursuant
to the AOTC).
242.
See id. at 1–3, 6, 11 (arguing that education tax credits are too expensive and largely
serve as a “windfall for universities” and recommending the expansion of Pell Grants and
direct loans to those most in need of federal aid).
243.
See, e.g., Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 112 (arguing that the “complex and uneven” changes in welfare policies since the 1970s “have worked to reverse [the] civic and political incorporation” of low- and middle-income Americans, including veterans).
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rity and Medicare are the only major New Deal entitlement programs to have survived the deregulatory turn intact—at once a
product of a strong organization and an explanation for seniors’
continued remarkable political engagement.
C. Prescriptive Implications
The critical prescriptive implication of this history of policy
feedbacks is that legislative choices inevitably shape both individual
political engagement and civil society. Without assuming that all
244
civic associations ipso facto contribute to liberal democracy, we
can thus take from the above discussion that legislative initiatives
that are not directly focused on elections also constitute a critical
point of entry for rebuilding the civic and political capacity of everyday Americans.
Generosity, visibility, and universality are key to whether legisla245
tion enhances democratic responsiveness or undermines it.
Form, in other words, determines the character of the democratic
cycle. The visibility of generous, non-means tested benefits influences individual participation by making the value of government
246
apparent to the beneficiaries. When individuals experience the
utility of government, they are more likely to recognize the im247
portance of taking time to engage in politics. This, in turn, is
likely to stimulate political solidarity and organizing.
By contrast, programs that recipients experience as harsh, paternalistic, or stigmatizing undermine civic and political participa244.
The KKK was one of the largest federated associations in the mid-twentieth century,
and its anti-democratic history, including physical vote suppression, is common knowledge.
In this regard, it presents the most obvious illustration of the dilemma posed by illiberal and
anti-democratic groups to arguments like mine that see robust civic groups as largely a
source of democratic strength. That said, it is perhaps worth acknowledging that the rise of
the KKK coincided with the rise of legislation that conferred benefits (civic and political) on
whites, as well as election regulation that was specifically designed to break the interracial
political coalitions that had formed in the wake of Reconstruction. See generally MICHAEL
PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888–1908 (2001); J.
MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS (1974).
245.
Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 110 (arguing this is one of four major ways that public policies can affect political engagement); see also Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics, 2
PERSP. ON POL. 55, 60–64 (2004) (identifying several axes of policy design that are likely to
affect the structure of politics—including “visible versus hidden, targeted versus universal,
obligation-oriented versus rights-oriented, participatory versus nonparticipatory . . . generous versus stingy, [and] privately provided versus publicly provided”).
246.
Cf. Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State, supra note 229, at 809 tbl.4 (finding
that “[t]hose who had used a greater number of visible [government] programs were significantly more likely to report that they paid their ‘fair share’ in taxes” as compared to those
who benefit from valuable tax breaks such as the home mortgage interest); see also Mettler &
Soss, supra note 245, at 62.
247.
See, e.g., METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 12–13.
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248

tion. The same is true for programs that are perceived as irra249
tional or poorly administered. Thus, the rate of political participation amongst those who are subject to Temporary Assistance for
250
Needy Families (TANF) is significantly lower than other groups.
More importantly, the low rates of participation are not fully explained by lower SES status, as the figures were much less dramatic
in the mid-twentieth century when welfare programs were more
251
generous.
Jamila Michener’s recent study of Medicaid is particularly revealing in this regard. As expected, she found that beneficiaries of the
program are “significantly less likely to vote, register, and partici252
pate more generally” compared to similarly situated individuals.
However, she was able to demonstrate further that the magnitude
of that effect differed in relation to differences in generosity and
253
administration of the program between states. Summarizing her
findings, she writes:
Beneficiaries living in states that expanded benefits in the
previous year are significantly more likely to register and
participate more generally; those living in states with a
higher density of welfare employees are substantially more
likely to register; those in states offering a wider scope of
optional services are more likely to vote; [by contrast] those
248.
Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral State, 104 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 817 (2010) (finding that those who have been incarcerated are significantly
less likely to vote, even after controlling for income and race); see also Mettler & Soss, supra
note 245, at 62 (contrasting evidence that attributes the political engagement of beneficiaries of Social Security Disability Insurance to their positive program experiences with evidence of the negative effects on political engagement of encounters with Aid to Families
with Dependent Children and the criminal justice system).
249.
MICHENER, supra note 101, at 61–70.
250.
Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 114–15.
251.
Id. at 117.
252.
MICHENER, supra note 101, at 79 (“The empirical support . . . is not incontrovertible, but it is strong evidence that Medicaid enrollment has an overall negative individuallevel correlation with political participation.”). Michener undertook a quantitative analysis
comparing the political engagement of Medicaid beneficiaries to similarly situated individuals through the use of the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study (FFS), a longitudinal
survey of 5,000 children born in U.S. cities. Even though the Medicaid beneficiaries (who
constituted 53% of the sample) were somewhat better off than a representative sample of
Medicaid beneficiaries, Michener found that “compared to the rest of the FFS sample, respondents who indicated being Medicaid beneficiaries are significantly less likely to vote,
register, and participate more generally.” Id. at 77 (reporting that they were about five percentage points less likely to vote or register and six percentage points less likely to undertake
other forms of participation). This finding held steady even after controlling for an array of
individual characteristics (age, sex, education, race, income) as well as factors that could
affect mobilization (church attendance, incarceration, and health status, including depression and drug and alcohol dependence). Id. at 76–79.
253.
Id. at 8 (explaining that “geographically differentiated political capacity” is a product of stark differences in the generosity of state program provision as well as the tenor of
administration).
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living in states that have recently reduced benefits are sig254
nificantly less likely to participate, vote, and register.
Put simply, Medicaid recipients “living in states offering a wide
scope of services, fiscally equipped bureaucracies, and expanding
Medicaid programs are significantly more likely to participate in
politics,” while those living in states that had recently contracted
255
services were significantly less politically involved. Michener
notes, further, that how states treat so-called optional services
(such as eye examinations and dental hygiene) proves among the
most visible and communicative choices with respect to generosity
256
or stinginess. Ultimately, she concludes that whether Medicaid is
“a boom or a bust for political engagement” depends on the ways
257
the program is formulated and implemented.
Visibility of beneficiaries is similarly critical. Where the class of
beneficiaries is evident, the incentives to mobilize and be mobilized, including by the socioeconomic elites capable of affording
the transaction costs of organization, are much more pro258
nounced. Once mobilized, such citizens are in a better position
259
to demand responsiveness. In fact, some researchers attribute the
recent decline in voter turnout among lower-income Americans
not just to TANF but to the fact that political parties no longer feel
260
the need to mobilize these voters.
To be sure, visible beneficiaries provide a target for countermobilization and scapegoating. That said, this dynamic is most
problematic where visibility is differential. The problem today is
the recipients of visible government benefits become ready targets
for backlash, while those who receive the most from the federal
government are hidden and out of range.
254.
Id. at 81.
255.
Id. at 14; see also id. at 81–82 (“As shown, compared to beneficiaries living in states
that did not reduce benefits, beneficiaries in states that had made the most reductions were
between four and nine percentage points less likely to vote, register, or participate.”).
256.
Id. at 52 (arguing that this is because vision and dental hygiene “are crucial for coping with everyday life and with the difficulties that affect low-income people”).
257.
Id. at 14. Michener’s findings offer an additional basis to be wary of efforts to impose cumbersome work requirements on Medicaid recipients. See Amy Goldstein, Kentucky
Becomes the First State Allowed to Impose Medicaid Work Requirements, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/kentucky-becomes-the-first-stateallowed-to-impose-medicaid-work-requirement/2018/01/12/b7b56e3e-f7b4-11e7-b34ab85626af34ef_story.html; see also Stewart v. Azar II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, (D.D.C. 2019) appeal
docketed, 19-5095 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 11, 2019) (refusing to uphold reinstated policy on remand
after striking initial requirements down as arbitrary and capricious).
258.
Mettler, Transformed Welfare State, supra note 40, at 209–10 (noting that beneficiaries
of visible and generous government largesse are much more likely to be represented by organizations and “much more likely to be mobilized by political parties and candidates,” regardless of income, as compared to “beneficiaries of . . . weak policies”).
259.
See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 117–24, 138–39.
260.
Mettler, Transformed Welfare State, supra note 40, at 204–12.
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D. The Affordable Care Act as a Contemporary Case Study
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the various repeal and replace options that were discussed in August 2017 provide a contemporary illustration of the potential for substantive legislation to
have positive democratic returns, while simultaneously illustrating
the policy feedback analysis that Part III argues should inform democracy reformers’ agendas.
The ACA is a hybrid of Reagan-era and more traditional New
Deal policymaking. Certain elements of the law dispense direct
government benefits and create visible beneficiaries, while others
do not. The expansion of Medicaid and the ACA’s protection
against rate discrimination based on preexisting conditions as well
as its requirement that insurers permit dependents under twentysix to remain on their parents’ employer-based policies create visible benefits and beneficiaries. The host of benefits accruing to individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance, by contrast,
remain largely invisible to the public.
The ACA’s expansion of Medicaid illustrates the democratic returns of the classic form of New Deal policymaking. Even with only
thirty-one states and the District of Columbia adopting the expan261
sion, over 10 million Americans were newly insured as a result.
The expansion was both visible and generous. Moreover, by simplifying eligibility criteria and enhancing state incentives to enroll eligible individuals, the ACA appears to have improved participants’
262
experiences of program administration. Consistent with the literature, early data suggests that both the expansion of Medicaid and
the passage of the ACA more broadly have had positive effects on
263
political participation. Michener, for example, found that Medicaid recipients in states that had adopted the expansion were sig261.
Cf.
KAISER
FAM.
FOUND.,
MEDICAID
EXPANSION
ENROLLMENT,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/medicaid-expansion-enrollment
(last
visited Aug. 2, 2019) (reporting that as of September 30, 2017, 32 states (including D.C.)
had expanded Medicaid eligibility resulting in coverage for over 12 million Americans).
262.
Cf. Tricia Brooks, The ACA Transformed Medicaid Enrollment Processes. Rolling Them
Back Would Wreak Havoc, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20170104.058223/full/ (explaining how the ACA has “transform[ed]
Medicaid into an efficient, modernized data-driven program”).
263.
See, e.g., Joshua D. Clinton & Michael W. Sances, The Politics of Policies: The Initial
Mass Political Effects of Medicaid Expansion in the States, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 167, 168 (2018)
(finding that “the expansion of Medicaid increased voter registration” in both 2014 and
2016, had a limited effect on voter turnout in 2014, but had no effect on turnout in 2016);
Jake Haselswerdt, Expanding Medicaid, Expanding the Electorate: The Affordable Care Act’s ShortTerm Impact on Political Participation, 42 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 667, 668, 681, 686 (2017)
(finding that expanded enrollment in Medicaid as a result of the ACA “significantly correlated with higher voter turnout in 2014 US [sic] House elections,” even after controlling for
a wide range of variables, and hypothesizing that this is because the Act motivated “both
beneficiaries and opponents” to vote).
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nificantly more likely to have registered to vote or to have partici264
pated in some other way in the following election cycle.
Not surprisingly, when repeal efforts began, beneficiaries and
other mediating advocacy groups were well positioned to mobilize
against the proposed repeal, attending hundreds of rallies and
265
town hall meetings to share their personal stories. Indeed, Michener’s qualitative research vividly depicts stories of individual activism giving birth to grassroots advocacy by beneficiaries of Medicaid
266
during various stages of the ACA fight.
Those 10 million, newly insured Americans knew exactly whom
267
to thank for their eyeglasses and their prescriptions. Some likely
even noticed the ease with which they were able to register for
268
Medicaid coverage. Equally importantly, Democrats, state governors, and an array of other advocacy groups—including those of
healthcare professionals—knew exactly whom to organize in their
effort to save the Act.
The repeal of Medicaid expansion along with efforts to replace
the system with block grants ultimately failed. Congressional Republicans retreated in the face of significant grassroots and elite
269
opposition, including among Republican governors. In the face
of mounting political opposition to the scaling back of a visible
benefit, an array of compromises, including a delayed repeal of the
270
ACA’s expansion of Medicaid, were considered. None passed.
264.
MICHENER, supra note 101, at 80–82.
265.
Id. at 11–12.
266.
Id. at 136–52 (describing the organizing efforts of one beneficiary, who not only
orchestrated a bus for beneficiaries to attend hearings at the state legislature, but also
trained others to be effective political advocates).
267.
See, e.g., Nick Castele, Meet the Republican Governors Who Don’t Want to Repeal All of
Obamacare, NPR (Jan. 23, 2017, 4:53 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/23/510823789/
meet-the-republican-governors-who-dont-want-to-repeal-all-of-obamacare.
268.
See Brooks, supra note 262 (noting that eligibility in some states is verified “immediately or overnight for more than 75% of applicants”).
269.
See Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Republican Unity on Health Care Is Elusive, Despite
Trump’s Support, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/
us/politics/affordable-care-act-health-care-trump.html (noting that “[l]awmakers from
states that expanded Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act face pressure back home—in
some cases, from Republican governors—” to oppose its repeal); Castele, supra note 267
(noting that the eleven Republican governors from states that chose to expand Medicaid are
lobbying to keep it and highlighting Governor Kasich’s efforts on behalf of the 700,000
Ohioans who have received coverage through the expansion).
270.
Amy Goldstein et al., Health-Care Bill Changes: For Conservatives, Moderates and New
Yorkers, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2017); Margot Sanger-Katz, G.O.P. Repeal Bill Would Cut Funding for Poor and Taxes on Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/06/upshot/gop-health-bill-would-cut-funding-for-poor-and-taxes-on-rich.html;
Timothy Jost, A Look at Republican Intentions? Diving Into The Leaked ACA Replacement Bill,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20170225.058932/full/; see also Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, House GOP Plans to
Keep Some Medicaid Expansion—And Steer Money to States that Never Bought In, WASH. POST (Feb.
24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/house-gop-plans-tokeep-some-medicaid-expansion—and-steer-money-to-states-that-never-bought-
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To be sure, the expansion of Medicaid was so visible and perceived to be so generous that it created resentment—particularly,
among individuals who felt that they had been forced to purchase
more expensive, less generous coverage through the private ex271
changes. Still, to the degree that this resentment bred activism, it
was not, per se, a democratic drawback. Indeed, some supporters of
repeal have expressed hope that the Act will be replaced with a
broader expansion of Medicaid to offer “the working poor a
272
chance at the same coverage the very poor receive.”
In other respects, however, the ACA was a quintessential example of American policymaking in the post-Reagan era, with invisibility undermining political mobilization. Its least visible beneficiaries are the approximately 150 million Americans who receive
coverage through employer-based health insurance plans. Even
relatively informed citizens are unlikely to recognize the range of
protections they received from the ACA: for example, the requirement that health plans cover preventative care services without patients either meeting plan deductibles or paying a co-pay;
the introduction of out-of-pocket limits to cap the dollar amount
individuals can be expected to pay in co-payments annually; and
273
the prohibition on annual and lifetime benefit limits. These individuals are also largely unaware of the indirect benefits they have
received from the ACA in the form of the lowest increases in
health insurance premiums in decades. Most importantly, these
individuals are unlikely to fully understand how the robust coverage, at relatively low costs, that they take for granted is subsidized
274
by federal tax policy that long pre-dates the ACA. Not surprisingin/2017/02/24/b23cb9f0-f9f7-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html (reporting that a Kaiser
Family Foundation poll found 84% of respondents support Medicaid expansion and favor
its preservation and, further, that support for the expansion was 87% in the sixteen states
with Republican governors that expanded Medicaid under the ACA).
271.
Sarah Kliff, Why Obamacare Enrollees Voted for Trump, VOX (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/12/13/13848794/kentucky-obamacaretrump (reporting that, in interviews, Trump supporters enrolled through the exchanges
expressed frustration that those on Medicaid are “getting even better, even cheaper benefits”).
272.
Id.; see also Drew Altman, Opinion, The Health Care Plan Trump Voters Really Want,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/the-health-careplan-trump-voters-really-want.html (reporting similar findings from a Kaiser Family Foundation focus group-based study of Trump supporters enrolled in either Medicaid or private
insurance through the exchanges).
273.
JoAnn Volk, Get Health Insurance Through Your Employer? ACA Repeal Will Affect You,
Too, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20170111.058297/full/.
274.
See Chris Ladd, Unspeakable Realities Block Universal Health Coverage in America, FORBES
(Mar. 13, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisladd/2017/03/13/
unspeakable-realities-block-universal-health-coverage-in-the-us/#399070f4186a (describing
the submerged state and the ways it benefits white Americans employed in the private sector, including by making their health insurance more affordable).

114

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:1

ly, then, there has been much less activism against the repeal of the
ACA from healthy individuals who receive health insurance
through work.
Between these two extremes was the ACA’s introduction of government-run health insurance exchanges. A hybrid policymaking
structure, the exchanges marry elements of the Reagan school with
elements of the New Deal approach. The Act creates exchanges in
which private insurers compete to provide health insurance to individuals who are unable to obtain coverage through their employers and are ineligible for Medicaid or Medicare. These private exchanges, like the ability of individuals to use them, are subsidized
by the government. For individuals, subsidies are provided on a
275
means-test basis through an array of tax credits.
Despite the provision of subsidies through the tax code, the exchanges have been visible—but also confusing and fraught with
276
administrative hiccups. Similarly, the so-called individual mandate, the requirement that individuals obtain health insurance or
pay a penalty, which was meant to both encourage participation in
the exchanges and stabilize insurance prices, also proved excep277
tionally visible.
While an estimated 9.2 million Americans have been insured
278
through these exchanges, the jury remains hung on the question
of generosity and efficacy. And still, the policy feedback loop from
these exchanges has surely been positive, where the measure is political engagement and mobilization. Those who have gained (or
been required to obtain) health insurance through the exchanges
know full well who to hold responsible and have made their voices
heard loudly and often since 2010. Moreover, both political parties
have been moved to organize Americans whose experiences of the
exchanges comports with the party’s platform.

275.
In general, tax credits are significantly more universal than either tax deductions
(which require itemization) or health savings accounts. These latter tax options tend to be
used by higher-income Americans. Tax credits, especially when they are advanceable and
refundable, are also more visible because they come to individuals as a sum of money from
the government. In fact, Senator Rand Paul, during the repeal debate, objected: “I think
refundable tax credits are just another word for subsidies.” Kaplan & Pear, supra note 269.
276.
Despite being visible, there has been a good deal of confusion about the ACA. See
Jeff Lagasse, Americans Are Still Confused About Healthcare Law, Survey Finds, HEALTHCARE FIN.
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/americans-still-confusedabout-healthcare-law-survey-finds.
277.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547–59 (2012) (describing
the thrust of Congress’s policy rationale for the individual mandate).
278.
ObamaCare Subsidies, OBAMACARE FACTS (Aug. 8, 2014), http://obamacarefacts.com/
obamacare-subsidies/ (last updated Feb. 21, 2019) (reporting, in addition, that 85% of individuals who purchased health insurance through the private exchanges received some government subsidy).
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The politics surrounding efforts to repeal the ACA in the fall of
2017 are a testament to the political power of visibility and generosity as well as the importance of giving political parties, and their
civic allies, an incentive to help mobilize their constituents—to all
279
the dynamics described above, that is. To be sure, the Act maintained and encouraged many vested interests, including hospitals,
doctors, and insurers, all of whom were active during the debate.
But special interest lobbying, as we know, looks different when in280
dividual activism and organizational advocacy is present. The end
result was a fluid political contest with individuals showing up at
town halls and rallies to plead their cases. The AARP’s intervention
281
was also critical to thwarting the repeal.
Ultimately, despite control of all three branches of government
and a longstanding platform promising repeal, spearheaded by key
donors, a Republican-led Congress was not able to repeal and replace the ACA.
Not only did the effort to scale back existing entitlements fail,
but shortly after it tacked a repeal of the tax penalties associated
with the individual mandate to the 2017 Republican tax bill, a Republican Congress was forced to concede to fully fund CHIP for a
decade.
The story of the effort to repeal the ACA and its failure constitutes a significant political win for low- and middle-income Americans—a win that should not be underestimated even as the ACA
remains vulnerable and our politics remains polarized and fluid. It
stands as a tribute to the civic and political returns from visible entitlement programs. By the same token, it raises democratic alarms
about efforts in some states to impose work requirements and other conditions on eligibility that are likely to subvert messages of inclusion and citizenship.

279.
See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, In Red-State Utah, a Surge Toward Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/health/utah-obamacare.html; Thomas
Kaplan, Angry Town Hall Meetings on Health Care Law, and Few Answers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/politics/affordable-care-act-sensenbrennerrepublicans.html.
280.
Robert Pear, Repeal of Health Law Faces a New Hurdle: Older Americans, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/us/politics/health-care-law-obamacarerepeal-older-americans.html; Margot Sanger-Katz, Why Even Some Republicans Are Rejecting the
Replacement Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/
upshot/why-even-some-republicans-are-rejecting-the-replacement-bill.html; accord GILENS,
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 11, at 121–22.
281.
Pear, supra note 280 (reporting how, in the middle of the debate, the organization
produced data showing, among other things, that seniors on the cusp of Medicare eligibility
(i.e., between 50–55) would face a $2,000–$3,000 increase in premiums under Republican
proposals).
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***
Moving again from the details of policy feedbacks to their prescriptive relevance, the critical point is that legislation does far
more than distribute or deny benefits and rights to individuals. It
also shapes individual relationships to democracy, creates political
constituencies, and stimulates civic organization.
Form matters. Policy ends can be achieved in ways that either
enhance democratic responsiveness by “stimulat[ing] political organizations, solidarity, and accountability” or undermine it by fos282
tering individual anomie and corporate rent-seeking. In this way,
legislative choices inevitably shape civil society and political engagement at both an individual and organizational level.
III. NEW STRATEGIES FOR DEMOCRACY REFORMS
Just as the demise of American democracy was not, and still is
not, inevitable, its restoration is similarly neither inevitable nor
foreclosed. Those interested in restoring functionality to our democratic institutions must, however, broaden our horizons.
The foundational insight from the previous section is that legislation, regardless of its substantive area, will play some role in the
trajectory of civil society. Legislation can either engage citizens and
incentivize the creation of civic groups, or it can breed political
disengagement, demobilization, and anomie. Indeed, the present
political incapacity of Main Street is importantly a product of the
form and extent of deregulation over the past thirty years.
The task, therefore, is to identify those legislative policies that
could tip the scale toward political empowerment and civic reorganization. Any effort to restore our democracy and fuel the recent
signs of civic revival must include the pursuit of policies that will
likely motivate individuals to participate in our democracy and
stimulate the reorganization of the interests of everyday Americans. This appreciation is especially critical given mounting evidence that the Roberts Court is disinclined to maintain established
approaches to good governance reforms, which have depended on
judicial intervention to reinforce democracy by increasing ballot

282.
Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 110 (arguing this is one of four major ways that public policies can affect political engagement); see also Mettler & Soss, supra note 245, at 62–63
(arguing for further research into the ways public policies influence political organization
and capacity).
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access, limiting political entrenchment, and restricting the influ283
ence of money on elections.
The analyses in the previous two sections provide yardsticks for
the sorts of non-procedural policies that should be central to the
broader democracy reform platform. In particular, they suggest
that the priority should be legislative opportunities that would:
x
Draw a broader, more representative, and diverse
swath of Americans into politics, particularly individuals who are low- and middle-income or young.
x
Spawn civic and political networks that span econom284
ic, racial, partisan, and geographic divides.
x
Offset the socioeconomic and racial segregation of
contemporary life that undermines opportunities for
individuals to associate across these axes of difference.
x
Stimulate the growth of economically self-sustaining,
membership-based civic associations that prioritize
democratic governance structures and operate in every state (whether through a formally federated structure or otherwise).
Once specific legislative policies addressing these criteria have
been identified, reformers must advocate forcefully to ensure that
they are implemented in generous, universal, and visible ways and are
285
fairly and competently administered. By the same token, versions of
such policies that distribute government largesse in ways that obscure either the fact of the benefit or who benefits should be
strongly opposed, as should policy choices and menus that lead to
286
differential disempowerment.

283.
See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572
U.S. 185 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
284.
A goal of racially integrated social networks may not actually be a partisan-neutral
goal, as the Republican Party’s current agenda is increasingly associated with nostalgia for a
period of white supremacy. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, Nearly Half of White Republicans
Say It Bothers Them to Hear People Speaking Foreign Languages, WASH. POST (May 8, 2019). In
early drafts, in deference to that reality, I emphasized socioeconomic integration, even as I
personally favor the goal of pursuing racially and socioeconomically integrated social networks. That decision, however, consistently alienated many potential allies, so I have decided
to abandon that aspect of partisan neutrality.
285.
See supra notes 245–260 and accompanying text.
286.
This is best conceptualized as a rebuttable presumption against disguised policymaking. The presumption could be rebutted when there are genuine policy reasons to prefer invisibility (as, for example, in 2010 when tax relief sought to stimulate economic
growth) or when it is simply infeasible to gain support for a visible alternative. The latter
justification should be undertaken with caution since, if exercised liberally, it would do significant harm to our democracy. In this regard, my view is that policymaking should be undertaken with two principles in mind: first, do no harm; second, do good where opportunity exists.
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A. Engaging a Broader Swath of the Electorate
Let’s start first with legislative proposals that could potentially
draw young as well as low- and middle-income Americans into politics. These could include efforts to make college education free
and to expand the availability of government health insurance.
Felon re-enfranchisement as well as legislation offering paths to citizenship for undocumented immigrants could also further this
goal.
The variety of efforts at the state and local level to make higher
education more accessible nicely illustrate the promises of those
reforms as well as what would be necessary to fully capture the potential civic returns. A college degree is currently the great dividing
line when it comes to economic resilience and success over a life287
time. Indeed, some researchers argue that college access is an extremely effective anti-poverty strategy for poor and working parents
insofar as it lifts families out of poverty and children out of the cy288
cle of poverty. At the same time, the rising cost of higher education has put college out of reach for many families. It even burdens
middle and upper-middle class families. Student debt constitutes
the highest proportion of consumer debt in an era of declining
289
household incomes.
Starting with Tennessee, several states and localities have acted
to address the college affordability crisis. In 2015, Tennessee became the first state to make community college free to high school
graduates who complete eight hours of community service, attend
mentorship meetings each semester, and maintain a minimum
290
grade-point average. Since then, sixteen states have followed

287.
BRAD HERSHBEIN ET AL., HAMILTON PROJECT, INCREASING EDUCATION: WHAT IT
WILL AND WILL NOT DO FOR EARNINGS AND EARNINGS INEQUALITY 1 (Mar. 30, 2015),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/impact_of_edu
_earnings_inequality_hershbein_kearney_summers.pdf (describing diverging earning
trends for those with and without a college degree and noting “lifetime earnings of workers
with a college degree are nearly twice as high as those without one”).
288.
See id. at 3 (clarifying that while increasing educational attainment will not close
“the gap between the rich and the middle—or between the exorbitantly rich and the merely
rich,” it is likely to “improve the economic position of those around and below the middle of
the current earnings distribution”).
289.
See No Jargon: The Cost of College, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Sept. 5, 2017),
http://nojargon.libsyn.com/page/5/size/25 (noting student loan debt as the most significant form of consumer loan debt despite the fact that most individuals owe relatively small
amounts given caps on the amount of debt available for an undergraduate degree); see also
Hodge & Pomerleau, supra note 241, at 5 (noting that student loan debt, which averages just
below $25,000, “is now the largest single type of outstanding debt, larger than both credit
card debt and auto loan debt”).
290.
Katie Loboscho, Tennessee Is Picking Up the Tab for Community College Students, CNN
(Sept. 18, 2015, 10:07 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/09/18/pf/college/freecommunity-college-tennessee/ (estimating 15,000 students would take advantage of the

FALL 2019]

Making and Unmaking Citizens

119

291

suit. New York recently adopted a program that provides free college tuition at SUNY and CUNY to families earning up to $125,000
a year. Nearly a million households will be eligible for the pro292
gram, although policymakers assume that many fewer will use it.
293
Similar programs have been adopted at the local level.
As the research described in Part II suggests, there is good reason to believe such programs hold the potential for positive civic
returns. Not only will the beneficiaries of free community college
be better educated (and thus more likely to participate in politics),
but, like the beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill before them, they will
likely be appreciative, and possibly even grateful, to the government. Once established, moreover, such programs are likely to
stimulate the growth of organizations to maintain them. Political
parties, meanwhile, will likely begin to attend to this new political
constituency. These programs may have a lower civic impact, compared to the G.I. Bill, because many are structured to cycle participants every two years. Still, there is good reason to believe that a
useful education, made possible by the support of the government,
will promote trust as well as interest in government and politics.
But the same research comes with a critical caution: the civic returns of such programs will hinge on both generosity and implementation. The most significant problem with the design of many
of these early programs—where the measure is generosity—is the
requirement that individuals attend college as full-time students to
qualify for the program. This renders the program inaccessible for
many students who can only afford to attend college on a part-time
basis.
An additional, but less obvious, limitation of most existing programs is their failure to offer comparable benefits to youth who are

program during its first year and explaining that the program is funded by the state lottery
fund).
291.
JEN MISHORY, THE FUTURE OF STATEWIDE COLLEGE PROMISE PROGRAMS: A STATE
GUIDE TO FREE COLLEGE, CENTURY FOUND. 1 (2018), https://productiontcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2018/03/16161350/Jen_PromiseFinal2-1.pdf.
292.
See Editorial Board, Opinion, A Promising Proposal for Free Tuition, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/a-promising-proposal-forfree-tuition.html (estimating that while 940,000 families could qualify, it is likely only
200,000 students would use the program if adopted); see also Governor Andrew J. Cuomo,
Press Release, Governor Cuomo Presents 1st Proposal of 2017 State of the State: Making College Tuition-Free for New York’s Middle Class Families (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/
news/governor-cuomo-presents-1st-proposal-2017-state-state-making-college-tuition-free-newyork-s (explaining the program would cover costs remaining after federal and state TAP
grants are applied).
293.
See Farran Powell, Which Cities Offer Tuition-Free College Programs, U.S. NEWS
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/
articles/2018-05-02/see-which-cities-offer-tuition-free-college-programs (noting that twentysix of the fifty largest cities in the United States offer such programs).

120

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:1

294

not college bound. This coverage gap is likely to further political
polarizations, similar to the response some Americans had to the
295
limited expansion of Medicaid under the ACA. Where college is
increasingly viewed as a badge of liberal elitism, rather than a
known path to economic mobility and security, this civic risk
296
should not be underestimated.
In this regard, attention to the student debt crisis should not
come at the expense of the broader need for affordable quality
297
skills training. Indeed, the G.I. Bill’s greatest civic returns came
from its support of educational opportunities below a four-year college degree. Ultimately, given the difficulties of policing the quality
of training programs, community college may be the appropriate
venue for offering high-quality job training and a path to well298
paying middle-skill jobs. But this will require state investment
since many existing community college programs would need to be
redesigned to offer high-quality job training and skills for the
299
trades that are in demand. Virginia’s New Economy Workforce
grant to community colleges to provide training in certain highdemand fields, including healthcare and welding, may offer a
300
model.
294.
See, e.g., Anne Kim, Forget “Free College” How About “Free Credentials”? 2017
PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. 1 (arguing that “the single-minded focus on college diminishes
other, equally viable paths to middle-class security” and “sends the wrong message to the
millions of Americans who opt out of college—not because they can’t afford it but [because
they] don’t want it or need it to achieve their aspirations”).
295.
See supra notes 272–73 (discussing resentment towards the gap between cost and
generosity of insurance available through Medicaid as compared to the state exchanges).
296.
Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Closing of the Republican Mind, N.Y. TIMES (July 13,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/opinion/republicans-elites-trump.html (reporting a stark rise, since 2016, in skepticism among Republicans about the value of college,
with 58% now reporting a negative view of higher education).
297.
JEN MISHORY, EXPANDING “FREE COLLEGE”: HOW TO BUILD A JOB TRAINING
GUARANTEE, CENTURY FOUND. (May 8, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/report/expandingfree-college-build-job-training-guarantee/ (arguing that a “universally accessible training
benefit would allow more workers to access higher-wage job opportunities”); PETER
GRANVILLE, CALIFORNIA’S WORKFORCE NEEDS CAL GRANT REFORM, CENTURY FOUND. (Feb.
25,
2019),
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/californias-workforce-needs-cal-grantreform/.
298.
Kim, supra note 294, at 8; see also Mishory, supra note 297 (identifying scale and
quality control as significant impediments to scaling up quality skills training initiatives).
299.
See, e.g., HARRY J. HOLZER, JOB MARKET POLARIZATION AND U.S. WORKER SKILLS: A
TALE OF TWO MIDDLES, 2, 7 BROOKINGS INST. (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/polarization_jobs_policy_holzer.pdf (noting that “a majority of
AA enrollees in recent years have concentrated in ‘liberal studies’ or ‘general studies’ with
virtually no labor market return”); see also Anthony Walsh, States Continue to Push Ahead on
Free College, CENTURY FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/statescontinue-push-ahead-free-college/ (noting that many state financial aid programs exclude
community college vocational programs).
300.
Kim, supra note 294, at 7. It is also likely that programs will need to be place-based
to be valuable. Growing evidence points to regional differences regarding employers’ willingness to offer non-college educated applicants middle-skills jobs. Cf. Mels de Zeeuw, Uneven Opportunity: Variation in Employers’ Educational Preferences for Middle-Skills Jobs, FED. RES.
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Additionally, programs need to address the economic realities of
the individuals seeking to utilize these programs. First and foremost, they should cover non-tuition costs for low-income students
who either cannot rely on family support or who have families to
301
support (as the G.I. Bill did). Programs like San Francisco’s and
Maine’s are potential models in this regard. San Francisco offers
free tuition to all city residents who enroll in the City College of
San Francisco, regardless of age or income, while providing supplemental assistance to low-income students to cover books, health
302
insurance, and other fees. Similarly, Maine’s 2017 Lift 2.0 program was carefully designed to address the known needs of working parents, including childcare and transportation costs (again,
303
not unlike the G.I Bill, which had a stipend for family members).
On an encouraging note, a recent review suggests that, at least,
304
some states may be working to address these issues.
Finally, regardless of their generosity, such programs must attend to administrative implementation if they wish to secure longterm civic returns. As Michener’s work on Medicaid demonstrates,
programs that are implemented through rules that are perceived
as arbitrary will not achieve second-order civic and democratic re305
turns. In this regard, several concerns that have already been
raised about the administration of the New York program are
troubling. Critically, the New York program operates with exceedingly narrow criteria for determining which courses satisfy the fulltime eligibility requirement. As such, meeting this requirement has
been a significant source of anxiety for many students.
In sum, moves to make higher education more affordable and
accessible have the potential to draw a wider swath of citizens into
civil society and politics. So do programs aimed at providing uni-

BANK
ATLANTA
(Feb. 2017),
https://www.frbatlanta.org/community-development/
publications/partners-update/2017/01/170125-uneven-opportunity-variation-in-employerseducational-preferences-for-middle-skills-jobs.aspx (summarizing a study showing significant
regional variation in “the availability and accessibility of well-paying jobs that do not require
a bachelor’s degree” and explaining that employers in regions with more educated workforces and higher wages tend to require a bachelor degree for middle-skills jobs, such as in
computing and nursing).
301.
Cf. METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 70, 88.
302.
Dave Berndtson, San Francisco Becomes First City to Offer Free Community College Tuition
to All Residents, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 8, 2017, 9:52 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
education/san-francisco-becomes-first-city-offer-free-community-college-tuition-residents
(reporting that the Mayor estimates the program will assist between 28,000–30,000 students
at a cost of about $5.4 million annually).
303.
See James Myall, ‘Lift 2.0’ Bill Will Pave the Way Out of Poverty for Many Mainers,
BEACON (Feb. 20, 2018), http://mainebeacon.com/lift-2-0-bill-will-pave-the-way-out-ofpoverty-for-many-mainers/.
304.
Walsh, supra note 299 (noting Massachusetts and Hawaii’s expansion of debt-free
college programs).
305.
Cf. MICHENER, supra note 101, at 61–70.
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versal access to quality healthcare and granting legal status to undocumented immigrants. However, legislators constructing these
programs must take care to ensure that they are designed more
like the G.I. Bill and less like Medicaid. The same analyses apply to
felon re-enfranchisement. The imposition of administrative hurdles, such as requiring individuals to pay all fines associated with
their conviction as a prerequisite to eligibility to vote, like cumbersome work requirements to receive Medicaid, or rigid full-time enrollment criteria, communicate unequal citizenship and undercut
the potential of such policies to stimulate civic engagement among
306
a broader, more representative swath of Americans.
B. Building Coalitions Across Existing Divides
Democracy reformers should also identify legislative opportunities with the potential to create constituencies that span economic,
partisan, and geographic divides. Such opportunities include
providing free educational opportunities, paid family and medical
leave, and access to quality affordable healthcare, including mental
health and addiction care.
Postal banking, while not in the foreground for many people,
offers an underappreciated opportunity to bridge the geographic
divide between rural and urban communities with the added virtue
307
that it is currently not a politically polarized issue. Many commercial banks have abandoned both rural areas and impoverished
urban neighborhoods as a result of both deregulation and technological advances. Concerned about profit margins, these banks
have also jettisoned critical products from these communities, including small loans to local businesses and low-income customers.
The result according to a 2013 study is that 28% of households in
the United States are “unbanked” (no formal relationship with a
308
bank) or “underbanked” (no access to incremental credit). In
low-income urban areas, “fringe lenders” have emerged to take the
place of these regulated banks. Fringe lenders charge high interest
rates and fees. Many perceive these lenders to be taking advantage
of low-income customers.

306.
See Patricia Mazzei, Floridians Gave Ex-Felons the Right to Vote. Lawmakers Just Put a Big
Obstacle in Their Way, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/us/
florida-felon-voting-amendment-4.html.
307.
See also GILMAN & RAHMAN, supra note 161, at 3 (arguing that we need to seek out
opportunities “to build multi-racial constituencies and alliances to make our democracy
more inclusive”—a “type of ‘us’ populism” to replace a “‘them’ populism”).
308.
Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 485
(2013).
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A number of legal academics have proposed that postal banking
could step in to replace low-income families’ reliance on checkcashing services, payday lenders, and title vendors, each of whom
collect fees and interest far beyond what chartered banks may
309
charge. Professor Mehrsa Baradaran, most prominently, has argued that post offices could offer the same services that fringe
lenders currently offer, as well as depository accounts at much low310
er costs. She defends postal banking as more efficient than imposing the responsibility for serving the needs of low-income cus311
tomers on mainstream banks. For one, the Post Office already
has offices in the low-income areas that commercial banks have vacated. For another, the Post Office is a highly familiar and trusted
place in many American communities. In April 2018, Senator
Kirsten Gillibrand introduced legislation that mirrors Baradaran’s
312
proposal.
Although there is a good deal of debate regarding the risks asso313
ciated with the Post Office getting involved in micro-lending, the
provision of depository services (i.e., checking and savings accounts, debit cards, ATMs, and online banking and bill payment)
through the Post Office may be a viable solution to the banking
needs of individuals and businesses in both urban and rural com314
munities. This is because, while rural businesses mainly suffer
from an inability to obtain credit lines and loans, they share with
low-income urban communities the negative consequences that
315
follow from the lack of access to depository accounts.
For our purposes, however, what is critical is that the potential
second-order democratic consequences of postal banking should
not be ignored in this policy debate. Postal banking would be a
309.
See, e.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165
(2014).
310.
Id. at 168–70 (emphasizing historical precedent for her proposal in the Postal Savings System, which was established to encourage individual saving and operated from 1910
to 1966).
311.
Id. at 167–69.
312.
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, Press Release, Gillibrand Announces Major New Legislation
to Create a Postal Bank to Wipe Out Predatory Payday Lending Industry Practices, Ensure All
(Apr. 25, 2018),
Americans
Have
Access
to
Basic
Banking
Services
https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/news/press/release/gillibrand-announces-major-newlegislation-to-create-a-postal-bank-to-wipe-out-predatory-payday-lending-industry-practicesensure-all-americans-have-access-to-basic-banking-services.
313.
Many who have expressed doubt about postal banking are wary of the risks associated with offering low-income people loans at rates well below those justified based on the risk
of default.
314.
Cf. Ruth Simon & Coulter James, Goodbye, George Bailey: Decline of Rural Lending
Crimps Small-Town Business, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
goodbye-george-bailey-decline-of-rural-lending-crimps-small-town-business-1514219515.
315.
Cf. id. (emphasizing that rural businesses suffer from significant problems getting
credit lines and loans, but noting they also suffer from the basic problem of not having easy
access to depository accounts).
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highly visible government program that many individuals would directly experience. More importantly, it would create a beneficiary
class that spans urban-rural political divides, even if the legislation
did not go so far as to permit the Post Office to undertake microlending. To the degree the experience was positive, it could instill
renewed faith in the federal government and cross-regional alliances. Whenever an urban or rural individual or business owner
used a Post Office to cash a check, deposit money, or take out a
loan, they would unavoidably recognize and appreciate that they
were interacting with the federal government. By contrast, the
most prominent alternative solutions to the banking problem
(administering federal banking through the Federal Reserve, federally subsidized credit unions, savings and loan associations, and
Morris Banks) would not provide similar visibility and transparency
and, therefore, are significantly less likely to create positive policy
feedbacks. Similar considerations should inform the debates when
policies with similar bridging potential are discussed.
C. Reducing Socioeconomic Segregation
The most intractable constraint that efforts to revitalize a robust
civil society will have to navigate is the rise of pervasive socioeco316
nomic segregation. In recent decades, mixed-income neighborhoods have become increasingly rare, while “exclusively affluent
317
and exclusively poor neighborhoods” have become the norm.
This socioeconomic segregation undermines the democratic virtues of civil society in a variety of ways and sets a third priority for
good government reformers.
Socioeconomic segregation means that there are simply fewer
opportunities to forge social ties across classes—and, in turn, rac-

316.
See, e.g., SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, THE CONTINUING INCREASE IN
INCOME SEGREGATION, 2007-2012, 9–10, STANFORD CTR. FOR EDUC. POLICY ANALYSIS (2016),
https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/the%20continuing%20increase%20in%20inc
ome%20segregation%20march2016.pdf (reporting that the rise in residential income segregation, which began in the 1980s, continues to increase and that “rising income inequality
continues to be a key factor leading to increasing residential segregation by income” in metropolitan areas); accord SEAN F. REARDON ET AL., HAS INCOME SEGREGATION REALLY
INCREASED? BIAS AND BIAS CORRECTION IN SAMPLE-BASED SEGREGATION ESTIMATES,
STANFORD CTR. FOR EDUC. POLICY ANALYSIS (2018), https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/
default/files/wp18-02-201805.pdf.
317.
Robert J. Sampson, Opinion, Division Street, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26. 2013),
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/26/division-street-u-s-a/; see also REARDON
& BISCHOFF, supra note 316, at 8, 13 (finding that, between 2007 and 2012, “middle-class,
mixed income neighborhoods became less common” and that working- middle- and uppermiddle-class families have been increasingly sorted into distinct neighborhoods).

FALL 2019]

Making and Unmaking Citizens

125

318

es. When parents volunteer in their children’s classrooms, attend
parent-teacher association meetings, or coach Little League, they
are unlikely to come into contact with parents from widely different socioeconomic backgrounds. Residential segregation by in319
come also undermines the integrative potential of public schools.
Moreover, to the degree that political participation is importantly social, socioeconomic segregation exacerbates existing inequali320
ties in civic and political participation. As Soss and Jacobs explain, the likelihood of “participat[ing] in politics depend[s] on
the interactions” individuals have “in families, peer groups, neighborhoods, workplaces, religious organizations, and community
321
groups.” When the politically disadvantaged are isolated from
peers privileged in the political game by education, wealth, and political knowledge, the losses for those individuals multiply. Soss and
Jacobs continue:
The advantages that flow from individual resources and
skills are compounded by the returns that accrue from living in a community where political information is plentiful
and organizations engage local residents. Conversely, living
in deeply disadvantaged neighborhoods both imposes
harsh conditions and removes critical communities and
networks . . . that might bolster skills and opportunity for
enterprising individuals. Political parties and candidates
acutely evaluate these changes and community conditions
322
and behave as rationale prospectors.
In sum, “[a]s Americans have become more segregated by class,
distinctive ecologies of political advantage and disadvantage have
323
emerged in higher and lower income communities.”
Interestingly, residential racial segregation, at least in the absence of concentrated poverty, may not have such deleterious civic

318.
See Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, How the Other Fifth Lives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/opinion/campaign-stops/how-the-other-fifthlives.html (summarizing recent studies demonstrating increased geographic and social isolation of economic elites and providing a clear graph of the significance of these changes
since the 1970s).
319.
Cf. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, OUR KIDS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN CRISIS (2015).
320.
See Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 123 (reviewing evidence that residential class
segregation along with educational, occupational, and marital economic segregation have
been on the rise since the 1970s); see also AMY WIDESTROM, DISPLACING DEMOCRACY:
ECONOMIC SEGREGATION IN AMERICA 113–40 (2015).
321.
Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 121.
322.
Id.
323.
Id. at 124 (explicitly contrasting contemporary patterns to the past, “[w]hen communities were more integrated along class lines [and] citizens with fewer political resources . . . benefit[ed] from their connections to the politically advantaged”).
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effects. A recent study found that Black neighborhoods foster polit324
ical participation. Specifically, it found that “Black Americans living in mostly Black spaces tend to turn out at higher rates than
325
their counterparts living in more diverse contexts.” That said, racially segregated residential patterns have other negative effects
and may reinforce political disconnects between communities of
326
color and political elites.
Finally, socioeconomic isolation reinforces the political distance
between elites and the rest of America. As Thomas Edsall recently
remarked, a consequence of geographic sorting is that “[t]he wellto-do are isolated from the day to day struggles of the middle class
and below”—from health care and education to unemployment
327
and financial anxiety about retirement.
For all these reasons, identifying policies capable of offsetting
socioeconomic segregation is critical to revitalizing civil society. A
variety of policies might make inroads at reversing this social isolation. The most direct approach would be for local governments to
adopt successful inclusionary zoning policies, including ones focused on deconcentrating poverty, such as the one that has been in
328
place in Montgomery County, Maryland since the 1970s. Montgomery County requires development projects that will result in at
least thirty-five residential units to set aside between 12 and 15 percent of those units for sale at below-market rates, and gives the
government the option to purchase up to one-third of those
329
units.
Local governments should also reconceive how children are dis330
tricted into publicly financed schools. Enrollment policies should
324.
Anoll, supra note 54, at 504.
325.
Id.
326.
Cf. Black Futures Lab, More Black than Blue: Politics and Power in the 2019 Black
Census (2009), https://blackfutureslab.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/More-Black-thanBlue.pdf (reporting on national survey of black political engagement and policy priorities).
327.
Compare Edsall, supra note 319 (quoting Timothy Smeeding, a professor of Public
Affairs and Economics at the University of Wisconsin), with METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS,
supra note 121, at 131 (observing that membership in socioeconomically integrated civic
groups probably helped “highly educated” veterans “better understand the needs, concerns,
and perspectives of citizens less well-off than themselves”).
328.
Exploring Inclusionary Zoning’s Effect on Affordable Housing, PD & R EDGE,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr_edge_research_012513.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2019).
329.
See HEATHER SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IS SCHOOL POLICY: ECONOMICALLY
INTEGRATIVE HOUSING PROMOTES ACADEMIC SUCCESS IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
4–5, 13, CENTURY FOUND. (2010), https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2010/10/
16005437/tcf-Schwartz-2.pdf (emphasizing the positive educational returns to low-income
children that have accrued from the fact that the local housing authority owns about 700
scattered-site public housing units that it allocates by lottery).
330.
See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN PRACTICE: LESSONS FROM
NINE DISTRICTS, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://tcf.org/content/report/schoolintegration-practice-lessons-nine-districts/; see also RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, NEW HOPE FOR
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affirmatively decouple residency (in segregated neighborhoods)
from educational opportunity. Local governments could directly
district elementary schools with an eye to socioeconomic integra331
tion. Alternatively, they could negotiate inter-districting plans.
Charter schools, similarly, could be required to adopt strategies to
ensure socioeconomic integration—such as drawing from multiple
districts within a metropolitan area or instituting a lottery weighted
332
for family income.
The policy feedbacks from integrated schools are likely to be
multifold. Existing data already shows that individuals who attended integrated schools are more likely to develop relationships with
individuals from different backgrounds and to seek out integrated
333
neighborhoods and workplaces later in life. Public schools, as visible benefits, are also well known as sites for civic engagement and
loci for organization. The key, therefore, is to promote school policies that produce democratic coalitions, rather than parochialism.
Another untapped site for policy intervention is the American
334
workplace—one of the most diverse spaces of American life.
Workplaces have the added advantage of being places rich in per335
sonal ties and common economic interests. Here, the task would
be to channel existing workplace diversity and social ties into organizations capable of building civic and political capital that
bridges critical gulfs in our society. One initial step that states and
localities could take would be to require employers to facilitate
payroll deduction to membership-based organizations that demon-

SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN NEW YORK CITY?, CENTURY FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/new-hope-school-integration-new-york-city/.
331.
KIM BRIDGES, EDEN PRAIRIE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: ADAPTING TO DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
IN THE SUBURBS, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://tcf.org/content/report/edenprairie-public-schools/; KIM BRIDGES, JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS: FROM LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT TO ONGOING COMMITMENT, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://tcf.org/content/report/jefferson-county-public-schools/.
332.
Cf. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE GOOD KIND OF SCHOOL CHOICE: WHEN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS INTEGRATE BY RACE AND CLASS, CENTURY FOUND. (May 23, 2018),
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/good-kind-school-choice-public-schools-integraterace-class/ (noting additional strategies with respect to enrollment, staffing, and school culture for promoting both racial and socioeconomic inclusion in schools).
333.
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG ET AL., A BOLD AGENDA FOR SCHOOL INTEGRATION,
CENTURY FOUND. (Apr. 8, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/report/bold-agenda-schoolintegration/ (reviewing an array of policies capable of fostering socioeconomic integration
of schools in the interest of better educational outcomes); accord The NAT’L COAL. ON SCH.
DIVERSITY, A SCHOOL INTEGRATION POLICY AGENDA FOR 2019 AND BEYOND (2019),
https://school-diversity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NCSD_Policy-Doc_Final3.pdf.
334.
Kate Tornone, Jenny Yang’s Final Days at the EEOC and Her Hopes for Its Future,
HRDIVE (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/jenny-yangs-final-days-at-the-eeocand-her-hopes-for-its-future/506222/ (quoting former EEOC Commissioner Yang, “The
workplace is really one of the only places where people from a wide variety of backgrounds
get to know each other.”).
335.
Sachs, supra note 22, at 172.
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strated sufficient levels of interest among their employees. New
York City’s 2017 Deductions Law, which requires fast food chains
to create and maintain a payroll deduction system to facilitate employee contributions to selected non-profits, could provide a mod337
el. The ideal law, however, would not single out a particular sector but would apply to all employers of sufficient size. More
importantly, it would be tailored to facilitate the paying of dues to
membership-based organizations. Organizations, in other words,
should not only have to demonstrate sufficient levels of employee
338
interest, but also demonstrate critical features of active membership—such as opportunities for face-to-face interaction, internal
339
democratic governance structures, and national scope.
D. Enlisting Philanthropists and
Stimulating Participatory Mass-Membership Groups
Thus far, the strategies discussed identify the sort of legislative
policymaking that could offset the participatory weaknesses of contemporary civic life but do not get to the heart of the matter: the
form of contemporary civic associations. Beyond scale, with respect
to both people and places, the critical weakness of civil society today lies in the demise of self-funded democratically governed
groups. Indeed, the remaining power of unions is unquestionably
tied to their economic strength arising out of membership dues—a
point fully recognized by those targeting the legal structures that
340
facilitate this economic wealth. By the same token, commentators
have observed how the absence of self-funding mechanisms (along
with the choice not to promote internal democracy) limits the political potential of non-traditional labor movements such as the Na341
tional Domestic Workers Alliance and the “Fight for 15.” These
critics argue that dependence on external funding from unions
336.
To avoid a preemption challenge, such laws would have to explicitly exclude labor
organizations which are governed by federal law. Cf. Rest. Law Ctr. v. N. Y. C., 360 F. Supp.
3d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (rejecting an array of First Amendment and preemption challenges
to the statute).
337.
Id. at 201–02.
338.
Id. (noting that to be eligible for the benefit under New York City’s law, nonprofits
were required to demonstrate to the local commission that at least 500 employees had expressed interest in joining).
339.
For a list of relevant features, see infra notes 366–369 and accompanying text.
340.
Matthew Ginsburg, Nothing New Under the Sun: The New Labor Law Must Still Grapple
with the Traditional Challenges of Firm-Based Organizing and Building Self-Sustainable Worker Organizations, 126 YALE L.J. F. 488, 494 (2016) (offering that “[a] plan for organizational selfsufficiency is . . . fundamental to any proposal for a new labor law or a new labor movement”
and noting that, in recognition of this, “[t]he vast majority of the major attacks on unions in
the last decade have focused on limiting the labor movement’s sources of funding”).
341.
Lee, supra note 25, at 512.
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and foundations creates financial instability and undermines in342
centives to expand the membership.
The final, and most critical, task for a broader democracy reform agenda, therefore, is to find ways to stimulate the growth of
muscular civic associations—organizations capable of operating at
sufficient scale, while also promoting social ties, active member343
ship, and civic skills.
This fourth benchmark rests at the limits of law. The fact is that
it is much easier to see how legislation can stimulate political engagement and the formation of groups than envision how legislation can restructure the form of the civic groups that emerge. To
be sure, one could follow the labor law model which requires un344
ions to adopt democratic structures. Any effort to impose democratic governance structures on civic associations, however, is likely
345
to raise considerable First Amendment concerns.
The limits of law to shape the form of civic organizations are less
discouraging when we appreciate that the burden of restoring
American democracy can be shared. We are at a unique moment
politically and technologically. With a good nudge from philanthropists, various strands of democratic renewal could well converge to make significant strides toward rebuilding, over the long
haul, participatory civic associations capable of vindicating the interests of everyday Americans through their mass participation.
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence in political activism.
The 2008 election was a high point for voter turnout. It was followed shortly thereafter with a series of protest movements draw342.
Cf. Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), https://prospect.org/
article/alt-labor (questioning the long-term political potential of the Restaurant Opportunities Center, a New York City alt-labor group that has seen significant victories in recent years,
given that it has a membership base of only 10,000 of the 200,000 workers in the city).
343.
GILMAN & RAHMAN, supra note 161, at 3 (emphasizing the challenges to scaling up).
344.
See 29 U.S.C. § 411 (2018) (requiring labor organizations to provide members equal
rights and privileges and to adopt internal democratic governance structures).
345.
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment shields certain civic associations (expressive associations and political parties) from state intervention in their internal
governance structures. E.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding
forced inclusion of a homosexual member pursuant to state’s antidiscrimination law violated the First Amendment right of the organization to determine membership rules for itself); Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (striking down as
unconstitutional California’s efforts to regulate the internal governance structures of its political parties). Not all civic groups are currently able to invoke these protections. However,
several First Amendment scholars have questioned the existing doctrine’s narrow conception of which organizations should be afforded protection. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj,
Friends, Associates, and Associations, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 54–68, 102 n.213 (2014) [hereinafter
Abu El-Haj Friends, Associates, and Associations] (arguing that to the degree nonexpressive
associations further an array of First Amendment goals, the doctrine’s focus on expressive
associations is misguided); JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF
ASSEMBLY 1–6, 20–62, 156 (2012) (criticizing current doctrine for being insufficiently protective of dissenting associations, and defending the need to provide robust protection for
illiberal associations).
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ing renewed attention to key concerns of the public, from income
inequality and money in politics to racism in the criminal justice
system. Then, there was the unexpected election of Donald
Trump. Renewed grassroots engagement with democracy moved
346
from the political fringes to the mainstream. Indeed, by a variety
of measures, his presidency has marked a significant renewal in civic engagement, culminating in the highest midterm voter turnout
347
in over a century.
Most promisingly, much of the recent grassroots activism has
been channeled into participatory political acts and associations.
Opposition to the election and presidency of Donald Trump has
brought Americans together in their neighborhoods to take both
local and national action. Political participation has moved from
being largely a matter of signing an online petition or making an
online donation, to protesting at the Women’s March or against
family separation, sitting in at the offices of one’s Senator, or creat348
ing a local chapter of Indivisible.
These forays into partisan politics have bred still broader politi349
cal engagement (as the social science literature would predict).
Individuals (many of them women) have been motivated to run for
350
office. Teachers across the country have been inspired to strike,
351
including in right-to-work states. Elsewhere, anti-Trump activism
352
has been rechanneled into local concerns and projects.
There has also been renewed interest in face-to-face forms of
participatory civic engagement. The irony is that this has been
made possible, in significant part, by advances in the digital age.
346.
See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 200.
347.
Rojanasakul et al., supra note 196.
348.
Indivisible is a network of citizens groups launched to resist the policies of President Trump. It was facilitated by the publication of an online guide to effective political resistance at the grassroots level based on an analysis of what had driven the success of the Tea
Party. See generally Osita Nwanevu, Indivisible, an Early Anti-Trump Group, Plans for a Democratic
Future, NEW YORKER (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/indivisible-an-early-anti-trump-group-plans-for-a-democratic-future (noting the authors
were congressional aides during early years of the Obama administration).
.
Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations, supra note 345, at 81–82, 85–86
349
(summarizing empirical research showing how “[i]nitial forays into public life quickly turn
into a habit, as individuals become part of social networks likely to encourage it” and thus
how “civic participation breeds more participation”).
350.
See, e.g., Alexis Sottile, Meet the Women Inspired to Run for Office After the 2016 Election,
ROLLING STONE (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:34 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politicsfeatures/meet-the-women-inspired-to-run-for-office-after-the-2016-election-112336/.
351.
See, e.g., Sean Rossman, Teachers Are Striking All Over. What Is Going On?, U.S.A.
TODAY (Mar. 30, 2018).
352.
See, e.g., Peter Slevin, Anti-Trump Protests Gave Way to Local Fervor that Helped Turn
Wisconsin Back to Blue, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/anti-trump-protests-gave-way-to-local-fervor-that-helped-turn-wisconsin-back-toblue/2018/11/23/cca2b672-edb7-11e8-baac-2a674e91502b_story.html (describing recent
civic revival in Eau Claire, Wisconsin and range of local initiatives that individuals energized
by the 2016 election have undertaken in small groups).
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The potential for the internet to reduce the transaction costs asso353
ciated with political organizing was quickly understood. With its
maturation, however, activists have grasped that the political potential of social media is greatest when it capitalizes on rich relationships and then scales up by bridging between closer-tie
354
groups. This has led to a rekindling of face-to-face politics
through social media.
Indeed, more than 5,000 Indivisible chapters have been established since 2016, when an online guide was published by experi355
enced Democratic congressional staffers. Even more unanticipated has been their participatory structures. Organized on social
media, most operate through local chapters that have meetings in
356
which attendees negotiate priorities and divide responsibilities.
Still, such scaling up has not yet occurred for most organizations. Moreover, small donations rather than membership dues
tied to participatory rights are, at the moment, the predominate
alternative to large donor funding. Even those nonpartisan organizations that foster active forms of civic engagement have yet to eschew foundation funding.
Ironically, foundations could step in at the limits of law to correct these tendencies and to nurture the recent sparks of civic revival by using their control over money to foster a civic reorganization capable of significantly impacting electoral politics and
policymaking in legislatures and administrative agencies. Philanthropy has had unintended negative effects on civil society, but it
has also been a critical driver of egalitarian social movements since
the mid-twentieth century. In this regard, the main problem with
modern philanthropy has been that, like most progressives, it has
overemphasized ideas and expertise and underemphasized the social foundations of politics. This, however, is changing. Foundations are learning.
353.
See Ben McGuire, Political Organizing in the Digital Age: Why Campaigns Need to Integrate Traditional and Digital Organizing, KENNEDY SCH. REV. (Aug. 22, 2018),
http://ksr.hkspublications.org/2018/08/22/political-organizing-in-the-digital-age-whycampaigns-need-to-integrate-traditional-and-digital-organizing/.
354.
Dana R. Fisher & Marije Boekkooi, Mobilizing Friends and Strangers: Understanding the
Role of the Internet in the Step It Up Day of Action, 13 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 193, 195 (2010) (reviewing research on ways internet has been used to “blend new and old forms of association”
and how “rather than replacing personal contact, the Internet has been seen to supplement
it”).
355.
Nwanevu, supra note 348.
356.
See, e.g., Brenda Schory, Residents Organize with ‘Indivisible Guide’ to Counter Trump
Policies, KANE COUNTY CHRON. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.kcchronicle.com/2017/02/05/
residents-organize-with-indivisible-guide-to-counter-trump-policies/ajlyn8a/ (describing a
coffee-shop meeting of an Illinois chapter of Indivisible); see also About, INDIVISIBLE,
https://indivisible.org/about (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (describing various forms of participation Indivisible prioritizes, such as “mak[ing] calls,” “show[ing] up,” “speak[ing] with . . .
neighbors,” and supporting “civic education and leadership development”).
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Indeed, several prominent foundations have been actively inves357
tigating new approaches to civic empowerment. Some have already pivoted to funding promising groups (rather than individual
projects). Others have been actively soliciting studies about how
best to spark more grassroots social change. There has been increased funding for coalition-building as well as longer grant cycles
to enhance effectiveness and autonomy, and many are working to
cultivate leaders and decisionmakers among the constituents most
affected by inequitable policies. All these shifts have been a product of increased self-awareness on the part of foundations of the
358
power that they wield in shaping civil society.
Foundations could go further and restructure grants in ways that
attend to the internal governance structures of civic groups. Grants
could be structured to nudge the promotion of genuine social ties
with and among members and the development of socioeconomically and geographically integrated memberships. Grants could also be structured to build up the capacity of such organizations to
operate at a national scale through participatory governance structures.
Indeed, the Ford Foundation recently solicited a review of its
programming with respect to its initiative, Promoting Electoral Re359
form and Democratic Participation. Among the challenges identified in the review was “the decline of democratic institutions that
360
have the local infrastructure” necessary to grow a membership.
The report recommended that the foundation prioritize the longterm value of investing to create “strong [federated] organizations
that can continuously hold institutions [politically] accountable,”
while themselves being organized to be accountable to their con361
stituencies. In this regard, the report specifically recommended
revising internal metrics to assess not only the capacity of potential
grantees to achieve tangible, near-term wins (profits) but also their
capacity to build governance structures and membership levels (assets). Such assets, it argued, are vital insofar as they are critical to
357.
For an illustration of these new approaches in the context of health policy, see
MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., USC PROGRAM FOR ENVTL. & REG’L EQUITY, THERE’S SOMETHING
HAPPENING HERE . . . A LOOK AT THE CALIFORNIA ENDOWMENT’S BUILDING HEALTHY
COMMUNITIES INITIATIVE 21, 25, 30–31 (2014), https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/
docs/TCE-BHC-Narrative-PERE.pdf.
358.
This new awareness is on display in the USC Program for Environmental and Regional Equity Report on the California Endowment Initiative. See id. at 36–41.
359.
HAHRIE HAN & LISA ARGYLE, A PROGRAM REVIEW OF THE PROMOTING ELECTORAL
REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION (PERDP) INITIATIVE OF THE FORD FOUND. 3–4
(2016), https://www.fordfoundation.org/media/2963/public-hanreport-apr2016.pdf (analyzing “strategies for increasing civic participation” with a focus on identifying strategies for
ensuring that democratic participation is “powerful, possible, and probable”).
360.
Id. at 21.
361.
Id. at 31.
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the Foundation’s longer-term goals of increasing democratic par362
ticipation and engagement.
The key, therefore, is to identify useful benchmarks for foundations wishing to assess and develop the capacity of civic associations
to build governance structures and membership levels capable of
fostering democratic participation and engagement at a politically
powerful scale. The previous sections offer useful yardsticks. With
respect to membership, measures might include:
x
the size of membership (perhaps a goal of a minimum
363
of 100,000 members);
x
diversity of membership, with particular attention to
socioeconomic diversity;
x
active membership (membership involving participation beyond writing checks);
x
ratio of professionals to volunteers;
x
regular opportunities for members to form relationships—blending of online and face-to-face opportunities, including periodic meetings, conferences, and
364
conventions.
With respect to participatory governance structures and the ability
to operate at political scale, measures might include:
x
democratic internal governance structures;
x
financial reliance on membership dues to provide
both engagement and a level of independence from
365
foundations and private donors;
x
a federated structure of subchapters in different states
or localities (on the order of 2,000 state or local chap366
ters) or similar evidence of geographic spread.
The purpose of these measures would be to nurture emerging
civic groups and nudge existing organizations toward greater appreciation of the democratic value of active membership, social ties

362.
Id. at 8, 22, 23, 27, 29–30 (defining assets as including “strengthen[ing] the relationship between the organization and its constituency and [] translat[ing] those relationships into elite lobbying power,” “having a robust infrastructure at the state and local level,”
and advocating for policies that will have positive political “feedback loops”).
363.
These figures are based on the membership levels and organizational infrastructure
of the large voluntary associations that dominated the mid-twentieth century. See SKOCPOL,
supra note 114, at 90–91.
364.
There is good evidence that successful membership-based civic associations deepen
the commitment of participants by creating a sense of community in the course of leadership development; however, those efforts do not require that the contact be in-person.
Blended strategies work. See HAHRIE HAN, HOW ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOP ACTIVISTS: CIVIC
ASSOCIATIONS & LEADERSHIP IN THE 21 CENTURY 17–23 (2014).
365.
See id. at 5 n.8 (identifying a key structure of membership-based organizations as
dependence on volunteers and governance through elected bodies).
366.
SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 90–91.
ST
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between members, and participatory democratic structures. With
respect to the goal of nudging established civic groups toward different internal structures, it is worth noting that some civic associations, even before the recent political revival, had begun to take
notice of the cost of operating without actual members. When the
ACLU of Pennsylvania and the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (PILCOP) sought to challenge Pennsylvania’s voter identification law in 2012, they scrambled to identify individuals who
lacked the requisite documentation proving their eligibility to vote.
The NAACP presumably did not have to scramble in 1950s and
1960s to find plaintiffs. Similarly, when the Pension Rights Center
sought to persuade the Department of Labor to adopt a rule that
would make it easier for workers without access to employermanaged 401(k)s to save for retirement, it could not rely on its
membership. It, ultimately, located seniors to testify to their retirement savings struggles through an affiliate that provides direct
services to seniors. In both cases, the professionalized associations
settled on a strategy of partnering with member-oriented groups.
Such groups, however, are not available for large swaths of Americans—including consumers, millennials, and working parents.
Finally, it is worth noting that it might be in foundations’ interest to take up this particular democratic reform agenda. Foundations are often looking for ways to wean the organizations that they
fund without undermining the investments they have already
made. In this regard, encouraging the development of dues-paying
membership at scale (for example, as a condition of access to future funding) would provide a strategy for partially weaning groups
off the foundation as the primary source of funding.
While foundations offer the most promising avenue for reempowering civil society, the limits of law as a lever for rekindling
membership-based civic associations organized through democratic governance structures should not be overstated. In addition to
the payroll legislation discussed in the previous section, the federal
tax code in principle could be used to reshape the form of civic associations by modifying the bases for offering such groups non367
profit status. That said, especially in the wake of the 2017
367.
The Internal Revenue Code shapes civil society through two provisions—Chapter
501 and Chapter 170—and the intersection between them. Under Chapter 501, the taxexempt status of an organization is defined by its ends. See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2018). It has
long been assumed that these provisions significantly contribute to the size and renown of
the nonprofit sector in the United States. See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 533 (2006) (noting that “its generosity is widely seen as an engine
of America’s [robust] nonprofit sector”). Some scholars, however, do question how much
the charitable deduction induces more charitable giving, and the empirical claim is difficult
to prove insofar as it depends on determining a counterfactual (i.e., how much giving would
occur in the absence of the tax incentive?). Still, the above makes clear that the claim that
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amendments to the tax code, there are at least three strikes against
it as a route to reform. First, under the amended tax code, fewer
and fewer Americans are likely to itemize deductions for charitable
368
donations. Second, the line between 501(c)(3)s and 501(c)(4)s is
salient for corporate lawyers and on Tax Day, but phenomenologically, it is fictitious. The NRA, Boy Scouts, NOW—indeed any nationally significant civic association that is likely to come to mind—
operate as both 501(c)(3)s and (4)s. For members and the public,
they are experienced as a single association—just as McDonalds is
experienced as a single corporation. Finally, any changes to the
current structure of the Internal Revenue Code will face significant
resistance from its current beneficiaries. Thus, while tax reform offers a possible legal route to stimulate democratically governed,
membership-based groups, its potential to nudge civil society in
this direction seems much less promising than changing the condi369
tions in foundation grantmaking.
implementing social policy through the tax code renders government spending invisible in
ways that undermine the vibrancy of civic associations and political participation does not
tell the whole story.
368.
The tax code’s most-preferred tax status arises from tax breaks on both ends—i.e.,
where both donations to the entity and the entity’s income are tax exempt. It is currently
bestowed on the subset of tax-exempt organizations known as “public charities.” 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2018) (providing that to constitute a public charity, under 501(c)(3), the
“[c]orporation[], . . . community chest, fund, or foundation” must be operated “exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals” on a not-for-profit basis) (emphasis added). Public charities, in return, must forgo,
to a substantial degree, activities aimed at influencing legislation or elections. For example,
a 501(c)(3) is limited with respect to the money it can spend engaging in either “grassroots
expenditures” or “lobbying . . . for the purpose of influencing legislation,” and it is entirely
prohibited from “participat[ing] in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
to) any candidate for public office.” Id. § 501(c)(3), (h). In addition, “no part of the net
earnings” of such associations may “inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” Id. § 501(c)(3). The recent tax reforms significantly limit the incentive for the average taxpayer to itemize deductions (including charitable deductions), thereby rendering
this aspect of the tax code a less significant lever. The benefit of the tax code’s allowance
that individuals and corporations may deduct contributions to such organizations from their
taxable income is that it permits high-income taxpayers to lower their marginal tax rate.
369.
In principle, the Internal Revenue Code could be amended to provide additional
tax relief to organizations that create meaningful civic opportunities for individual members. For the reasons explained above, the attributes to reward would include: dues-paying
membership, socioeconomic and geographic diversity of membership, opportunities for
face-to-face engagement, and participatory internal governance structures. In other words, a
revised Code would be recalibrated so that tax-exempt status turned on both the purposes
and the organizational structure of an association. To be clear, many civic associations that
already exhibit these attributes, e.g., unions, are eligible for tax-exempt status under the
current Code. See id. § 501(c)( 4)–(12), (19), (23) (providing tax-exemption status to labor,
agricultural and horticultural organizations, business leagues and chambers of commerce,
recreational clubs, various types of fraternal benefit societies and orders, as well as veteran’s
associations). The problem is that they are not given preferential treatment, as compared to
those organizations that are professionally run and foundation funded. Moreover, their taxexempt status does not turn on their organizational structure per se, but rather on the purpose for which they are formed.
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***
In sum, it is time to broaden the democracy reform agenda to
include the pursuit of policies that are likely to motivate individuals to participate in our democracy, stimulate the reorganization of
the interests of everyday Americans, and fuel the nascent signs of
civic revival. Legislation offers a significantly underappreciated lever through which to do this, and it is encouraging that many of the
proposals that are on the existing policy menu, if approached wisely, could start that process. Reforms that have not yet become po370
larized are particularly promising in this regard.
Beyond identifying policy priorities, however, any bill that is being seriously considered should be subject to a rigorous policyfeedback analysis. The potential for positive collateral consequences ultimately depends on resisting the temptation to disguise the
distribution of government largesse. We must learn from Obama’s
mistakes. During the Obama years, Democrats made significant efforts to reverse the trend toward directing the bulk of government
social spending toward corporations and households in the very
highest socioeconomic brackets. Unemployment benefits were extended during the Great Recession, the number of uninsured
Americans substantially dropped, and the federal government took
on a direct role in student lending. Unfortunately, many of these
programs were distributed as tax incentives or by private actors,
rendering invisible the myriad benefits the new government had
371
conferred on middle-class Americans.
CONCLUSION
The path from political participation to policy responsiveness is
not straightforward. Structural features of American democracy
stand in the way—from the Senate and Electoral College to the
fact that officials are elected in winner-take-all elections. As such,
neither eagerly participating in the pluralist chorus nor electing
one’s preferred candidate guarantees the policy responsiveness
that many Americans are craving. Still, there is a long way from
where we are to a place where the gaps in policy attention can reasonably be attributed to these structural barriers to responsiveness.

370.
It may be concerning to some that it appears that only progressive reforms have
positive returns for political capacity and democratic responsiveness: Where does this leave a
good government, economic conservative, firmly opposed to government redistribution of
wealth in either direction, but equally concerned that elected officials are insufficiently responsive to the preferences of ordinary Americans?
371.
Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State, supra note 229, passim.
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The future of American democracy depends on broadening our
conception of what good governance reform entails. We must
acknowledge that democratic dysfunctions also stem from distortions in the political inputs (civil society). Only once we move beyond our myopic focus on procedural reforms will it be possible to
appreciate the full array of opportunities that exist to rebuild our
democratic institutions or to identify the allies capable of sharing
that burden.
The path forward is sure to face significant obstacles—and not
simply because the beneficiaries of the New Gilded Age will oppose
challenges to their political power. The socioeconomic segregation
of contemporary life poses a formidable challenge to efforts to reverse the vicious cycle of democratic politics today. But there are
other obstacles.
While there are no silver policy bullets, we can take heart in the
knowledge that the demise of American democracy was not inevitable, and its revival is similarly not foreclosed. Entrenched problems demand multifaceted interventions aimed at incremental
change, but they also demand vision.

